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FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES
RALPH F. Fuc st
Public concern over the operation of administrative agencies of
government, especially in the Federal system, has increased during the
past several years. Congressional inquiries into agency performance and
into "influence" upon it has led to startling, if limited, disclosures. More
fundamentally, doubt has arisen whether the public interest entrusted to
the agencies is being served at all adequately, while long-standing ques-
tions about the fairness of certain agency proceedings to the private
parties involved have been raised with new urgency. As a result propo-
sals for radical changes in agency organization, especially the separation
of major policy functions from the function of adjudication, have been
made with augmented force; measures to reform administrative pro-
cedure across the board have received increased attention; and numerous
bills to cope with the influence problem have been introduced and made
the subject of hearings.
People generally recognize today, as thoughtful lawyers and writers
always have, that certain agencies are the principal means of keeping
order in important areas of economic and social endeavor, such as radio
and television broadcasting and public transportation; that others are
required to dispense important benefits to individuals, to which society
has become committed, such as workmen's compensation, unemployment
compensation, and old age and survivors insurance; and that taxes will
continue to have major economic consequences flowing not only from the
statutory tax structure but also from the effectiveness of collection.
Hence the old cry of less government interference gives way to one for
improvement of administration; but the means of improvement are far
from clear.
Sweeping answers to the problems presented should not be expected;
for the inescapable variety of agency operations and the complexity of
t Professor of Law, Indiana University. On leave 1960-61, as adviser to the India
Law Institute.
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interests at stake are too great. Reorganization of particular agencies
may be expected to occur, and efforts to improve agency processes, de-
mandingthe thought and effort of legislators, administrators, and coun-
sel for private parties, are a continuing necessity. Administrative pro-
cedure legislation can be bettered. All such changes must draw on ex-
perience with existing law in order to establish new law, whether relat-
ing to fundamentals or merely to matters of meticulous detail. The law
involved is, of course, administrative law-still rather new in the Anglo-
American system, but embracing concepts and standards which make up
an integrated though imperfect whole.
The purpose of the present article is to present some of the basic
aspects of agency organization and procedures, which are fundamental to
a consideration of current proposals for reform. Against this back-
ground later articles to be published elsewhere will review these proposals
for the purpose of identifying the ones that seem sound and rejecting
those that might endanger more of the benefits of agency operation than
they would safeguard.
VARIETY OF AGENCIES
Administrative agencies are established pursuant to statute," or
sometimes, in the States, by constitutional provision, to deal with spe-
cific, defined subjects. As a result, the province of each agency is
limited, and the agency specializes in its particular field. With rela-
tion to, the subjects with which they are thus required to deal, admin-
istrative agencies may be grouped in the following categories: (1) those
that deal with personal conduct or status, such as the conduct or status of
highway users or aliens or members of supposedly subversive organiza-
tions, or with conduct or conditions in the general community, affecting,
1. Conceivably the President of the United States has power, derived directly from
the Constitution, to establish administrative agencies to carry out the President's own
authority, especially his authority relating to military emergencies. See the discussion
of wartime agencies and of the Presidential authority, indefinite in scope, to enforce the
Constitution, in CoRwiN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 147-152, 227-237, 239-
250, 255-256 (4th ed. 1957). There was a statutory base, although often an ex-
tremely general one, for all the numerous agencies created by executive order in con-
nection with World War II in so far" as those agencies possessed powers of legal regu-
lation, as distinguished from authority to use cajolery, economic threats, agreement, and
the pressure of publicity. See Chapter III of W. J. Wilson, The Price Control Act of
1942, in [O]FFIcE OF TEmPORARY CONTROLS, THE BEGINNINGS OF OPA (circa 1946) for an
account of the legislative foundations of the emergency agencies established before and
shortly after the outbreak of the war. The governing constitutional principles and much
of the pertinent historical record are reviewed in the seven opinions of Justices of the
Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Statutory authority in the President to transfer, consolidate, and abolish agencies or
their functions, subject to disapproval by either house of Congress within 60 days, has
been conferred since 1932 by successive reorganization acts. See for the 1949 act as
subsequently extended, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 133Z-1-15.
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for example, the public health; (2) those that regulate certain aspects of
business in general, such as competitive marketing practices, prices dur-
ing emergencies, labor relations, or factory safety; (3) those that regu-
late a single industry or occupation, such as transportation, communica-
tion, banking, insurance, or the several trades and professions; (4) those
that dispense benefits to individuals, such as copyrights and patents, pay-
ments to veterans, compensation for industrial accidents, and various
forms of social security allotments; (5) those that manage public enter-
prises or property upon which legal rights or privileges depend, such as
the post office and the public domain; and (6) those that assess and col-
lect taxes or enforce other governmental demands such as military service.
The methods which various agencies employ are likely to differ
somewhat according to the kinds of affairs to which they give attention.
Those that are concerned with business enterprises, except under some
local licensing laws, are usually required to afford substantial procedural
safeguards to the interests they affect,2 unless acute danger to the public,
such as the danger from spoiled food or adulterated drugs or from the
continued operation of a failing bank, requires summary action.' An
agency that deals with a single industry is likely, in addition, to develop
continuing contacts with the industry, such as may turn the regulatory
process to some extent into one of cooperation, or at least of continuous
interchange of information and views.4 The dispensing of benefits
upon which individuals are dependent should, and often does, produce
agency methods initially unaccompanied by hearings, that emphasize
2. The requirement of a judicial-type hearing was originally indicated on constitu-
tional grounds in relation to administrative proceedings relative to public utility rates.
C.M. & St. P.R.R. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 457 (1890). Cf. People ex rel. McAleer
v. French, 119 N.Y. 502, 23 N.E. 1061 (1890). The requirement was extended to other
regulatory controls over utilities, see Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933), and
came to be regarded as a procedural norm of wide application, designated by the term
"fair hearing." See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), 304 U.S. 1 (1938) ;
United States v. Libby, McNeil & Libby, 107 F. Supp. 697 (D. Alaska 1952). The pro-
cedures of state utility commissions and many other state regulatory agencies are simi-
lar; but occupational licensing has traditionally been carried on through the informal
processes developed by trade and professional groups or by local governments, rather
than through quasi-judicial procedures. More careful procedures are gradually develop-
ing in the licensing area too, even apart from general administrative procedure legisla-
tion. Byse, Opportunity to be Heard it License Issuance, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 57 (1952).
3. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) ; Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
4. See GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS Ch. IV (1941); Lan-
dis, The Development of the Administrative Commission, printed in GELLHORN, ADMIN-
ISTRATIvE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 1, 3-5 (2d ed. 1947) ; Loss, SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 762-784 (1951) ; Western Traffic Association-Agreement, 276 I.C.C. 183
(1949). As to consultation with private interests in rule-making see REPORT, [U.S.]
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 103-105 (1941) (here-
inafter cited as A.G. Com. REPT.).
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speed, accuracy, and uniformity in the handling of claims. Such is the
case, for example, in the field of unemployment compensation, where
thousands of applications a week may need to be processed and paid
promptly if the purpose of the governing statute is to be fulfilled. Gov-
ernmental requirements, such as the need for tax money for current oper-
ations,5 or the need for members of the armed forces, have traditionally
led to the use of relatively informal, even summary, methods.' Pro-
cedural processes developed in one administrative area are likely, how-
ever, to win wider acceptance and therefore to be transferred elsewhere.
Thus, the Federal Governmetit's method of income tax collection now per-
mits a formal hearing to be had before payment of disputed amounts,'
both because of current general ideas about proper procedure and be-
cause a government possessing the economy's best credit rating scarcely
needs prompt, unquestioning payment of taxes as acutely as did the Eng-
lish crown several centuries ago. Similarly, the traditionally summary
methods of the post office,' of deportation,' and even of Selective Serv-
ice'0 have yielded strikingly to developed notions of due process of law;
and the Supreme Court is strict in requiring procedural safeguards be-
fore freedom of speech can be indirectly restrained through administra-
tive action.'" The Federal Administrative Procedure Act 2 prescribes
procedural safeguards for broad classes of agency proceedings. A simi-
lar development through state decisions and legislation is occurring."8
5. See Iagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708-710 (1884) ; Murray's Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, (1856).
6. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (summary tax collection);
United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953), Uffelman v. United States, 230 F.2d 297
(9th Cir. 1956), and United States v. Pitt, 144 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1944) (hearing and
administrative appeals in Selective Service proceedings).
7. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954 § 6213.
8. Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804 (1951), reversing 189 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1951).
9. Through their check upon deportation orders in habeas corpus actions, the courts
were able in the name of due process of law to impose procedural requirements on de-
portation hearings which, with no statutory foundation, introduced many of the formal
safeguards of fairness. See Deportation and Due Process, 5 STAN. L. Rav. 722 (1953) ;
Oppenheimer, Recent Developments in the Deportation Process, 36 MIcH. L. REv. 355
(1938). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 enacted these requirements into
statute. 66 Stat. 209, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b).
10. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955).
11. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
12. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1011 [hereinafter cited as A.P.A.].
13. Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954) ; Mazza v. Cavicchia,
15 N.J. 498, 105 A.2d 545 (1954). State administrative procedure legislation is as fol-
lows as of January 1, 1960: ALASKA Com'. LAWS ANN. §§ 2A-11-1 to -101 (Supp.
1959) (rule-making and publication), §§ 2A-12-1 to -32 (Supp. 1959) (adjudication and
judicial review); ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1001 to -1008 (1956) (rule-making), §§
12-901 to -914 (1956) (judicial review), §§ 12-931, 12-932 (1956) (stay of order); CAL.
Gov'T CODE §§ 11180-11191 (1955) (investigation by heads of departments), CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §9 110.5, 110.6 (1955) (hearing officers, recommendations by Division of
Administrative Procedure in Department of Vocational & Professional Standards), CAL.
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SPECIALIZATION AND EXPERTNESS
Each agency's personnel necessarily specializes in the agency's
duties. The agency should therefore either possess initially or soon
acquire expertness in its work, unless it is, for example, a small lo-
cal license bureau marked by frequent changes of officials. 4 Expert-
ness may come about because technically qualified agency heads or
staff members, or both, are appointed, or may result simply from
subsequently acquired experience in an agency's special field. Of
the latter variety is the expertness on some medical issues which com-
monly develops for example, among the members of a workmen's com-
Gov'T CODE 8§ 11370-11528 (1955) (rule-making, duties of Division of Administrative
Procedure in Department of Professional & Vocational Standards, procedure in licens-
ing), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (1955) (review by writ of mandate) ; CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. §§ 4-41 to 4-50 (1958) (rule-making); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-279
(1959) (judicial review), ch. 127, §§ 263-268 (1959) (filing of regulations) ; IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 60-1501 to -1511 (Burns 1951 as supplemented) (rule-making), §§ 63-3001 to
-3030 (Burns 1951 as suplemented) (adjudication and judicial review) ; Iowa CODE ANN.
§§ 17A.1-17A.10 (1949 as supplemented) (rule-making) ; IXAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-
401 to -414 (1949) (filing of regulations) ; Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 13.075-13.125 (1959)
(rule-making) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 244-256 (1957) (rule-making, adjudication,
and judicial review) ; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, §§ 1-17 (1952 as supplemented)
(rule-making, adjudication, and judicial review); MICH. Comp. LAws §§ 24.71-24.82
(1948 as supplemented) (rule-making), §§ 24.101-24.110 (1948 as supplemented) (ad-
judication and judicial review) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.0411-15.0422 (1946 as supple-
mented) (rule-making, adjudication, and judicial review); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 536.010-
536.140 (1953 as supplemented) (rule-making, adjudication, and judicial review); NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 84-901 to -916 (Supp. 1959) (rule-making, adjudication, and judicial re-
view); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-10-13, 4-10-17 to -19 (1953) (filing of regulations);
N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 8 (1939), N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAWS §§ 102-105 (publication of
regulations) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-195 to -198.1 (1951) (filing of regulations), §§
150-9 to -34, 143-306 to -316 (1951 as supplemented) (licensing and judicial review);
N.D. REV. CODE §§ 28-3201 to -3222 (1943 as supplemented) (rule-making, adjudication,
and judicial review) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 111.15, 119.01-119.13 (Page 1953 as sup-
plemented) (rule-making, adjudication, and judicial review) ; ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 183.010-
183.510 (1953 as supplemented) (rule-making, adjudication, and judicial review); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.1-1710.51 (1942 as supplemented) (filing of regulations, ad-
judication, and judicial review) ; S.C. CODE §§ 1-11 to -17 (1952) (filing of regula-
tions) ; S.D. CODE §§ 33.4201-33.4216 (1939) (judicial review), § 65.0106 (1939) (filing
of regulations) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-501 to -506 (1955) (filing of regulations and
written opinions in adjudications), §§ 27-901 to -914 (1955) (review of orders); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.1 to -6.14 (1950 as supplemented) (rule-making, adjudication, and
judicial review) ; WASH. REv. CODE §§ 34.04.01-34.04.930 (1959) (rule-making, adjudi-
cation, and judicial review) ; V. VA. CODE ch. 159, § 258(1) (1955) (filing of regula-
tions) ; WVis. STAT. ANN. §§ 227.01-227.26 (1957) (rule-making, adjudication, and judi-
cial review). For an analytical summary of this legislation to the time of writing see
Harris, Administrative Practice and Procedure: Comparative State Legislation, 6 OKLA.
L. PEv. 29 (1953).
14. COMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERN-
MENT, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COM tMISSIONS 22-25,
34 (1949), indicates the extent to which specialization and expertness on the part of
the members of certain Federal agencies are at times defeated by turnover in office oc-
casioned by inadequate salaries and other causes. The staffs of these agencies are,
however, not affected by these factors.
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pensation commission having on it a lawyer, a businessman, and a former
employee or union leader, as the members gain familiarity with the medi-
cal aspects of occupational injuries and diseases. More significant on
the whole is the expertness which is intentionally created through the ap-
pointment of specially qualified agency heads, the employment of tech-
nically trained staffs, or both; for in these circumstances it is evident that
a primary purpose of establishing the agency is to bring its expertness to
bear in resolving the problems entrusted to it. It is also evident that, as
an agency develops, its fund of knowledge and experience is stored not
only in the minds of its personnel, but also in its records and files.
The "expertise" of agencies has often been said to be their raison
d'etre; and so it is to a large extent. The tribunal "appointed by law and
informed by experience""1 is necessary for the satisfactory solution of
many problems which government must handle; and when such a tribunal
has been established the courts meticulously defer, on the whole, to the
conclusions it reaches."0 It may be difficult for a given agency to bring
sufficient expertness to bear at a particular time, because its personnel
may be quantitatively or qualitatively inadequate, or because the magni-
tude of the problems presented may outrun the agency's store of informa-
tion or its ability to focus the resources it has; but it is difficult to see
how economic and social problems could be better solved governmentally
than by the operation of agencies equipped to apply an objective judg-
ment, bringing expert knowledge and technical data to bear when needed,
to problems that are carefully investigated, analyzed, and presented." In
England, when an effort was made to regulate railroads through the
Court of Common Pleas, the experiment was adjudged a failure ;"s and
a much later official inquiry in that country rejected the suggestion that
either the courts or other non-specialized tribunals could undertake the
15. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. ICC, 206 U.S. 441, 454 (1907) ; Assigned Car Cases, 274
U.S. 564, 580-581 (1927).
16. The record as to the Interstate Commerce Commission is reviewed in 2 SHARF-
MAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 417-452 (1931). See also Ayr-
shire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 335 U.S. 573 (1949). As to other agencies see
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945); SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428-429 (1957).
17. As to legislative purposes in establishing the independent Federal regulatory
agencies see CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1941), in which
the legislative history is reviewed. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
(5 vols., 1931-1937), contains a detailed account and a highly favorable judgment of
the operation of the Commission along these lines. Compare HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMmiSSION (1924). For an analysis and estimate of the operation of the var-
ious independent agencies which had become established by the post-World War II
period see the TASK FORCE REPORT ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMIssIoNS, supra
note 14. As to administrative agencies generally see LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 23-46 (1938).
18. ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADmINISTRATIVE LAw 91-93 (3d ed. 1951).
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tasks performed by the then numerous specialized administrative tri-
bunals."
Political influences in the appointment of personnel, improper pres-
sures upon agencies which may warp their decisions, and discouragements
which cause qualified staff members to leave government service often
produce wide gaps between the ideal of an expert agency, zealous to carry
out the functions entrusted to it, and the spotted actuality of administra-
tive performance. Procedural safeguards against abuses stemming from
these causes, as well as against arbitrariness from other causes, are
needed; but if they are given a form which is inconsistent with the meth-
ods that experts need to employ, the very purpose of establishing an ex-
pert agency may be defeated. The need to reconcile procedural safeguards
with continued agency ability to render specialized service lies at the
heart of many of the problems of administrative procedure. Problems
not solvable in this way must be attacked through improved political pro-
cesses bearing on appointments and on the conditions of public service.
Specialists and experts necessarily reach conclusions in part on the
basis of knowledge and skill that lie beyond ordinary lay experience. In
private affairs the managers of enterprises, arbitrators of disputes, and
the members of professions reach decisions in their own ways, usually
on the basis of direct inspection and informal inquiry. The manager re-
ceives reports, conducts interviews, and decides; the physician examines
and diagnoses; the architect or engineer plans and prescribes. Their de-
cisions are commonly accepted by those whom they affect, or become
binding upon such persons under prior contracts or corporate charters.
The fact that the similar determinations of government administrative
officers are given statutory effect, defining the resulting rights and
duties without the consent of the persons concerned, often requires that
procedural safeguards, drawn from judicial experience and supplement-
ing the safeguards residing in the methods natural to experts, be made
available. These typically consist of proceedings that include opportunity
for hearings at which interested parties may introduce evidence, meet the
evidence offered by others, and make arguments to the deciding authori-
ties, leading to reasoned decisions by these authorities. Such proceedings
are commonly called "formal" or "trial type" proceedings or, in the words
of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, proceedings leading to ac-
tion "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."'" The
question arises, how far and in what way the formulation of expert judg-
19. REPORT OF THE COMMnITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND INQUIRIES,
Cmnd. 218 (1957), paras. 39, 120-126.
20. A.P.A. §§ 4(a), 5(a).
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ments can and should be subjected to proceedings of this type. Alterna-
tive safeguards, which also are common in administration, include super-
vision by superior officers of officials who gather data or make deci-
sions, and subsequent administrative review of the actions taken.
AGENCY DIsCRETION
The expertness of administrative agencies may relate either to
determining matters of fact, such as the value of a piece of property
or the danger of an epidemic of disease, or to settling issues of policy,
such as the rates that a public utility may justly and reasonably charge,
the desirability of licensing a new enterprise to serve the "public
convenience and necessity," or the justification for imposing the incon-
venience of a quarantine in order to avert an epidemic of disease. The
former kind of determination requires an informed judgment of the
available evidence; the latter necessitates, in addition, weighing the con-
sequences of alternative courses of action and selecting the one that seems
best. When this second kind of determination is made, "discretion" in a
distinctive sense is exercised.2"
Some agencies, such as those that handle social security claims, are
not vested with discretion in this sense, because the statutes they admin-
ister are not intended to authorize the agencies to make choices of policy.
The deciding officials are required to determine the facts in each case and
apply the law to them. Even though these processes are actually far from
mechanical, there are supposed to be external criteria in the facts them-
selves and in the law, whereby the outcome is determined. Discretion, on
the other hand, involves an intended power of choice among alternatives.
When an agency exercises discretion in trial-type proceedings, as reg-
ulatory agencies commonly do, procedural problems of a special nature
are likely to arise. Discretion, it has been said, means that "a determina-
tion may be reached, in part at least, upon considerations not entirely sus-
ceptible of proof or disproof."2 By the same token, the evidence ad-
21. "Administrative discretion is the freedom of choice or judgment with which an
executive officer or an administrative agency is entrusted in order to insure the constant
and complete effectuation of the legislative policy in any situation which might arise
in connection with the enforcement of the statute." Cooper, Adminhistrative Justice
and the Role of Discretion, 47 YALE L.J. 577 (1938). Many meanings have been
given to the term discretion, including one which embraces determinations of doubtful
facts and interpretations of law as well as choices of policy; but as will appear, sig-
nificant differences exist between these three operations. Cf. Patterson, Ministerial and
Discretionary Official Acts, 20 MICH. L. REv. 848 (1922) ; RoBsoN, JUSTICE AND AD-
miNSTRATIvE LAW 399-490 (3d ed. 1951).
22. FREUND, ADmINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 71 (1928).
Discretion in this sense is sometimes said to involve the exercise of "authority" or fiat,
and to be necessary in a system of "law" as well as consistent with such a system, in
situations where rules based on reason, including science, do not exist to guide decisions
FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS
duced in hearings for purposes of proof cannot fully cover the discre-
tionary issues to be determined; the agency must add something more in
the end. What it adds may be expressed in findings or a written deci-
sion.23 Expert or opinion testimony may be introduced at the hearing
with relation to the discretionary issues, but be later rejected by reason
of agency views, even when there is no conflict in the testimony. The
question then arises whether the decision really results from the hearing;
and affected private interests may be disquieted by the belief that it does
not.
The check of judicial review operates imperfectly in such situations;
for a discretionary determination, reached in a rational manner by an
agency authorized to make it, must in the nature of things be final.
Others may disagree with it, but they cannot prove it to be wrong; and
the law, by vesting the discretion, has specified the authority whose view
is to be given effect. The discretionary choice may later prove successful
or unsuccessful under governing standards; but until changed by another
exercise of discretion, it stands. The Federal Administrative Procedure
Act recognizes the finality of agency discretion by providing that judicial
review of agency action, when not precluded for other reasons, shall be
accorded "[e]xcept so far as . . .agency action is by law committed to
agency discretion."24  Since a court in a review proceeding may never-
theless determine whether a discretionary determination falls within the
agency's authority and, usually, whether it is free of abuse, the Act does
not mean that such a determination cannot come before the courts, but
simply that the agency's conclusion is final if it is not ultra vires or arbi-
trary. There are instances, however, in which a court may decline to ex-
amine into the question of alleged abuse of discretion.25
Discretion and the traditional conception of law are inconsistent
with each other. Conventionally, law applies rules which already exist to
facts after they have been ascertained; and there is no room for choice.2
that must be made. See J. Hall, Authority and the Law, in AUTHORITY 63-66 (Fried-
rich ed. 1958); Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 376, 377-381
(1946).
23. "[A]dministrative tribunals in making their findings are free and indeed re-
quired, to draw upon the entirety of their specialized experience, which is necessarily un-
disclosed in the record." Learned Hand, J., in Feinstein v. New York Cent. R.R., 159
F. Supp. 460, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
24. A.P.A. § 10.
25. See, for example, United States v. One 1957 Buick Roadmaster, 167 F. Supp.
597 (E.D. Mich. 1958) (discretion of the Attorney General to deny remission of for-
feiture of a vehicle for violation of the Narcotics Act, in the case of an innocent mort-
gagee).
26. See Brandeis, J., dissenting, in International News Service v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215, at 262 (1918) ; DICKINsoN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY
oF LAW 15-25 (1927); Bikl6, Administrative Discretion, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1
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If error transcending allowable limits occurs, it can be corrected on re-
view."8 Discretion, on the other hand, invokes the judgments of men to
reach decisions that are not prescribed by rules and that cannot be cor-
rected at the instance of those who may disagree. Hence discretionary
power may seem arbitrary, and may be regarded as "government by men"
as opposed to a "government of laws." Yet the exercise of discretion is
a growing feature of modern government, because of the increasing com-
plexity of the problems to be dealt with. Rules generally specify rela-
tively few factors in a total situation, such as the statutory qualifications
for entry into marriage or the items of conduct that constitute theft, as a
basis for reaching legal conclusions. More and more present-day prob-
lems, such as the decision of whether to authorize the adoption of a child
or the allocation of radio and television frequencies, require the weighing
of a host of factors that can only be indicated in advance and that must
be judged flexibly, through the exercise of discretion, as circumstances
may require. The propositions of law applied by the courts, as well as
the statutory provisions which govern administrative agencies, reflect this
change, as they more and more take the form of broad principles or
standards, rather than of rigid rules.29
It does not follow that there is no rule of law at all in connection
with the exercise of discretion, or that arbitrary power is on the increase
in modern government. Several safeguards surround the exercise of dis-
(1933). It is recognized, of course, that "equity," or the limited power to adjust law
to meet the requirements of fairness, is an indispensable aspect of a system of law in
operation; and equity implies discretion. Traditionally it operated only in particular
areas of law.
27. In reality the facts with which official agencies must deal in their proceedings
can rarely be directly apprehended and, therefore, be known with maximum certainty.
They are ascertained, rather, by the receipt and consideration of evidence, much of
which may be conflicting. The "facts," therefore, are typically inferences, or conclu-
sions, even when they consist of physical events. Hence, on the same body of evidence,
opposite conclusions as to the "facts" can frequently be reached rationally. In deciding
one way rather than the other in such situations legal agencies can and do make choices.
Since rules of law frequently are in conflict or lacking in precision, choices may also
be made in applying them. Realistically, therefore, the antithesis between law and dis-
cretion is less than the conventional distinction allows; yet it is not, as has been asserted,
without substance. GRIFFITH & STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 143-144
(2d ed. 1957). For it is conceded that discretionary administrative decisions should
not be judicially reviewable (id. at 195), whereas judicial review of determinations of
fact and of law stands in a different light (id. at 193-194).
28. Conventionally, a judicial determination of fact is accepted on appellate re-
view unless "clearly erroneous"; and a jury's determination must stand unless the evi-
dence in support of it does not satisfy minimum standards of sufficiency. FED. R. Civ.
P. 52; 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 3814-3819 (2d ed. 1953). Error of law is fully
subject to correction on appeal; but the "error," if any, often involves disagreement by
the appellate court with the trial judge as to the applicable rules, rather than the cor-
rection of genuine mistakes.
29. Pound, The Administrative Application of Legal Standards, 44 A.B.A. REP. 445
(1919).
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cretion by administrative agencies. In the first place, the range of ad-
ministrative discretion is commonly limited to what is needed to carry out
statutory purposes; and the limits imposed are legally enforceable. Trans-
portation rates are determined by administrative agencies, for example,
not entirely as the agencies see fit, but so as to be "just and reasonable"
in a specialized sense which experience has defined. In the second place,
expert discretion usually involves, not mere guesses as to the future, but
the use of scientific and professional techniques for measuring, let us say,
health hazards, or the economic effects of price changes. These tech-
niques reduce the merely personal element or aspect of fiat in discretion-
ary decisions by setting limits within which the discretion must operate.3"
In the third place, legal requirements relating to the procedure by which
discretion is exercised often make it necessary to set forth the bases of
decision in writing and to disclose the reasoning process of the deciding
authority in a way that subjects the results to criticism and to some ex-
tent guards against error or abuse. Unexplained departure from previous
standards of decision may result in judicial reversal of an exercise of dis-
cretion because of capriciousness.3 ' These safeguards adapt the adminis-
trative discretion which is required in solving modern problems to the
continued need for rationality and some degree of predictability in the
operation of law.
It has been pointed out that the use of scientific methods, although
governed by ascertained laws, is not part of that system of law directed
to human values and possessing considerable continuity and consistency
of its own, which the governmental "rule of law" envisages.3" Yet the
specialists and experts who constitute the core of most administrative
agencies, including the lawyers who advise or restrict the others at criti-
cal points, are no less aware of the legal tradition, in so far as it forms
part of the general culture, than are the members of legislatures from
whom the great bulk of modern law stems.33 Even such an administra-
30. "There is nothing alarming in the term discretionary power. It has a legal
meaning, with safe limitations. The intendment of a law which grants it, whether ex-
pressly or by implication, is that the discretionary decision shall be the outcome of ex-
amination and consideration; in other words, that it shall constitute a discharge of of-
ficial duty, and not a mere expression of personal will. An arbitrary disapproval of a
license, for example, determined upon nothing but the mood of the officer, would not
be, in contemplation of law, an exercise of the power granted. It would constitute, on
the contrary, a neglect and refusal to perform his official functions, and would expose
him to the interference of this court ... " U.S. ex rel. Roop v. Douglass, 19 D.C.
(8 Mackey) 99, 108-109 (1890).
31. See NLRB v. Mall Tool Co., 119 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1941).
32. See POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 71-91 (1951).
33. In the 1950's the fairness of the methods of legislative investigating committees,
when judged by judicial analogues, proved to be at least as difficult to secure as the
fairness of administrative proceedings.
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tive determination, unattended by a hearing, as whether an airplane is
airworthy and therefore eligible to carry passengers34 is not likely to be
capricious or disregardful of the economic and human factors at stake;
and the administrative prescription of a food standard by which the ship-
ment and marketing of a product is to be governed, when reached after
an elaborate trial-type proceeding, 5 is surely not less an expression of the
"rule of law" than a legislative prohibition of "filled milk"3 or even a
judicial determination that the manufacturer of a product which has
caused harm to a consumer must pay a certain sum -as damages.
Judicial review plays an important part in keeping administrative
discretion within bounds, as well as in correcting the abuse of discretion
in other ways."8 A discretionary administrative action may, for example,
be set aside as capricious because totally irrelevant factors have deter-
mined it. More frequently agency action may be held invalid because the
discretion which has been exercised, although not inherently unreason-
able, has taken account of factors which are simply not embraced by the
governing legislation.39 The agency, in other words, has stepped beyond
its field of special competence and has exercised too broad a discretion.
For example, refusals of licenses under health or building safety statutes
in order to further traffic safety or keep down the number of competi-
tors in a trade have been held invalid,"0 as have rate orders of the Inter-
34. 52 Stat. 1009-1012 (1938), as 'amended, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 553, 555, 559, 560.
35. Federal Security Adm'r. v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943).
36. Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
37. DICKERSON, PRODUcTs LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 83-211, 234, 241,
262-265, 279-282, 284 (1951).
38. For a discussion of judicial review of discretion in England see S.A. DE SMITH,
JUDIcIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACION Ch. 6 (1959).
39. U.S. ex rel. Belfrage v. Shaughnessy, 212 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1954) (refusal of
bail to alien who had invoked 5th Amendment before Congressional committee) ; Crocker
v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 568 (Ct. Cl. 1955) ; U.S. ex rel. Bittelman v. District Di-
rector, 99 F. Supp. 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (rejection of bondsman because of member-
ship in "subversive" organization). In U.S. ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d
489 (2d Cir. 1950), the opinion of the court, by Learned Hand, J., remarks that the
exercise of a broad discretion is valid unless it affirmatively appears that it "has been
actuated by considerations that Congress could not have intended to make relevant."
40. Chamberland v. Selectmen of Middleborough, 328 Mass. 628, 105 N.E.2d 389
(1952) ; Klipsch v. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 215 Ind. 616, 21 N.E.2d 701 (1939) ;
Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N.E.2d 281 (1938); State ex rel. Strike v. Common
Council, 201 Wis. 435, 230 N.W. 70 (1930). See also Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S.
367 (1929); Insuranshares Corp. v. Pa. Securities Comm'n, 298 Pa. 263, 148 Atl. 107
(1929) ; Doran v. Eisenberg, 30 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1929) ; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
v. Linehan, 73 N.H. 41, 58 Atl. 956 (1904) ; Marx, A Note on Review of Discretion, 87
U. PA. L. REV. 954 (1939), and Economic Improvisation by Public Authorities, 88 U. PA.
L. REv. 425 (1940) ; Laski, Judicial Review of Social Policy in England, 39 HARV. L. REv.
832 (1926). Compare A.T. & S.F.R.R. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953)
(discretion as to apportionment of costs of grade crossing elimination) ; Despatchers
Cafe v. Somerville Housing Authority, 332 Mass. 259, 124 N.E.2d 528 (1955) (motive
for otherwise valid exercise of discretion does not invalidate it); People v. Service
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state Commerce Commission that resulted from the Commission's belief
that it should secure the economic welfare of certain shippers, rather than
confine itself to transportation factors."' Sometimes agencies take too
narrow a view which courts subsequently correct,42 of the matters open
to their consideration. It may be difficult to tell from the words used in
a statute what, precisely, comes within the discretion they define. Such
a broad statutory phrase as "public interest" or "just and reasonable"
could embrace almost anything. Economic justice to shippers in rate
fixing, which under some circumstances, as has been said, cannot be
taken into account for its own sake, may enter the range of permissible
agency discretion because the impact of rates on shippers has long been
estimated by carriers in order to keep particular shippers in existence as
sources of traffic, or because "discrimination" in rates, which carriers
must avoid and the Commission exclude, relates closely to economic op-
portunity for shippers and localities.43 In general, the scope of allowable
discretion under broad statutory standards reflects historical and prac-
tical factors which may be more significant than the words used in de-
termining what is relevant and what is not." The final determination
as to the breadth of an agency's discretion is made by the courts if re-
Recognition Bd., 403 Ill. 442, 86 N.E.2d 357 (discretion to define "widow" under vet-
erans bonus law) ; Lloyd v. Ramsey 192 Iowa 103, 183 N.W. 333 (1921) (discretion to
disapprove financial structure of corporation); Weiss v. State Bd. of Equalization, 40
Cal. 2d 772, 256 P.2d 1 (1953) ; Barth v. DeCoursey, 69 Ida. 469, 207 P.2d 1165 (1949),
and Harrison v. People, 222 Ill. 150, 78 N.E. 52 (1906) (breadth of discretion in liquor li-
censing) ; Pompeii Winery v. Board of Liquor Control, 167 Ohio St. 61, 146 N.E.2d
430 (1957) (broad interpretation of statutory authority to fix liquor prices).
41. Ann Arbor R.R. v. United States, 281 U.S. 658 (1930); Phila. & Reading R.R.
v. United States, 240 U.S. 334 (1916) ; Southern Pac. Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 433 (1911).
See MANSFIELD, THE LAKE CARGO COAL RATE CONTROVERSY (1932) ; Mansfield,
the Hoch-Sinith Resolution and the Consideration of Commercial Conditions in Rate
Fixing, 16 CORN. L.Q. 339 (1931). See also American Overseas Airlines v. CAB, 254
F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (determination of air mail pay).
42. FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86 (1953); ICC v. Railway Labor Ex-
ecutives Ass'n., 315 U.S. 373 (1942); Sunbeam Television Corp. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 26
(D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Telanserphone, Inc. v. FCC, 231 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See also
U.S. cx rel. Partheniades v. Shaughnessy, 146 F. Supp. 772 (1956).
43. Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 335 U.S. 573 (1949). See Group
Rates: A Questionable Feature of the Railroad Rate Structure, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 204
(1949).
44. N.Y. Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932); Wiscon-
sin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929) ; United States v. New York Cent. R.R., 263 U.S.
603 (1924) ; ABC Freight Forwarding Corp. v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.
N.Y. 1954), aff'd. 348 U.S. 967 (1955) ; White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954) ;
Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 11. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1954). In Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), and Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958), the Court
divided as to the considerations the Secretary of State might take into account in with-
holding passports. Compare Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (discretion of
the Attorney General to withhold bail from alien Communists pending deportation pro-
ceedings) ; Ocon v. Landon, 218 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1954) (semble).
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view proceedings are available and cases are brought.4"
Under case law which is mainly a matter of recent development, a
purported exercise of administrative discretion in a particular case, if
subject to judicial review, may be set aside by a court where the resulting
action stems demonstrably from a fixed policy based on general con-
siderations, instead of from an individualized judgment which the per-
sons affected are entitled to receive.46 In other words, a stereotyped ba-
sis of action cannot validly be substituted for a discretion that should be
exercised from case to case. Thus, it has been held that an alien denied
a discretionary suspension of deportation simply because he fell within
a class which had been arbitrarily designated as not to receive suspen-
sions has been granted judicial relief." An agency may, however, for-
mulate and announce general policies in advance of particular discretion-
ary decisions, provided they are not made rigid so as to prevent changes
from case to case ;48 and there is authority for the view that unexplained
departure from a consistent administrative policy, even though the
policy need not have arisen, may under some circumstances result in judi-
cial relief to a party adversely affected. On this ground, the Attorney
General was prevented by a court from deporting an alien whom he had
45. In Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958), the Court extehded the previously
recognized category of military actions subject to review, in order to strike down the is-
suance of an other-than-honorable discharge from the Army on account of pre-service
factors which were beyond the lawful purview of the military authorities. Compare
Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, 356 U.S. 309 (1958). See also American Overseas
Airlines v. CAB, 254 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (factors to be considered in determin-
ing financial need of carrier for purposes of air mail compensation).
46. Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Co., 281 U.S. 599 (1930) ; Harkness v. Iron, 278
U.S. 92 (1928); U.S. ex rel. Mosier v. Work, 261 U.S. 352 (1923); NLRB v. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. den., 361 U.S. 943 (1960);
Doran v. Eisenberg, 30 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1929) ; Swalbach v. State Liquor Authority, 7
N.Y.2d 518, 166 N.E.2d 811 (1960) ; Pisco v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 331 Mass. 539,
120 N.E.2d 643 (1954) ; Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 251 Pac. 784 (1927). Cf.
Office Employees Int'l Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957) ; Frankfurter and Burton,
JJ., dissenting, in Carlson v. Landon, supra note 44. Gross v. New York City Alcoholic
Beverage Control Bd., 7 N.Y.2d 531, 166 N.E.2d 818 (1960). See also Note, 15 MoD. L.
REV. 73 (1952).
47. Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1950). See also Lim Fong
v. Brownell, 215 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (refusal by the Attorney General to con-
sider withholding the deportation of Chinese under a statutory authorization to do so in
the case of deportation of "any alien . . . to any country in which in his opinion the
alien would be subject to physical persecution . . . for such period of time as he deems
to be necessary for such reason"). And see Frank, J., dissenting, in U.S. ex rel. Accardi
v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1953). (For subsequent decisions in the same
case, turning on a different but related point, see U.S. ex rel Accardi v. Shaughnessy,
347 U.S. 260 (1954) ; Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955). Com-
pare Clair v. Barber, 258 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1958).
48. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); FTC v. Ce-
ment Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 700-703 (1948). See the discussion of James Alger Fee, J.,
concurring, in Teamsters Local No. 183 v. NLRB, 238 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1956). Cf.
RoBsoN, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 401-414 (3d ed. 1951).
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discretion to deport,40 where the threatened deportation violated a settled
practice to withhold action pending Congressional disposal of a private
bill to permit the alien to remain."c The principle of mandatory consist-
ency in the exercise of discretion has been said to possess especially great
strength where a change in previous policy would operate with retro-
active effect ;1 but this view encounters the same well known difficulty
as is involved in determining whether statutes operate retroactively. 2 It
is evident that a continuing power to exercise discretion permits changes
of policy which are not capricious, and may require them when circum-
stances change or when the agency gains new insights." The readiness
49. U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). Technically the de-
portation involved was an exclusion, since the alien had not been admitted finally to this
country.
50. U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. McGrath, 181 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1950).
51. NLRB v. E & B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960) ; NLRB v. Guy At-
kinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952); See also Office Employees Int'l Union v.
NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957); Matlack v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 617 (E.D. Pa.
1954).
52. In the Atkinson case, supra note 51, an order for the reinstatement of a dis-
charged employee was said to involve retroactivity where the employer had had the
assurance of a previously "fixed and . . . notorious" policy of the National Labor Re-
lations Board that jurisdiction over enterprises of the type the employer conducted would
not be exercised. In NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1957) the same
court saw no danger of an invalidating retroactivity in a similar situation in which it di-
rected the Board to consider departing from previous jurisdictional policy in relation to
a discharge which the court thought was palpably illegal. See NLRB v. Gottfried Bak-
ing Co., 210 F.2d 772, 781 (9th Cir. 1954) (change of policy enlarging Board's exercise
of jurisdiction could validly cover discharge, previously not covered, growing out of
closed shop agreement known to be illegal at the time it was entered into) ; NLRB v.
Chauffeurs, etc., Union, 274 F.2d 19 (7th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. National Container
Corp., 211 F.2d 525, 534 (2d Cir. 1954). In NLRB v. Int'l Brotherhood, 225 F.2d 343
(8th Cir. 1955), the court declined to approve a Board order to the extent that it would
"brand" as illegal a contract provision of a type which the Board had previously de-
clared to be not unlawful in itself. In Atlas Tack Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange,
246 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1957), a policy of the Exchange, which the S.E.C. held valid and
enforceable, enlarging a previous policy, was held not retroactive-certainly not "objec-
tionably" so- even though it resulted in "delisting" the stock of a corporation on the
Exchange for reasons which the corporation had no means of knowing, at the time the
reasons arose, might later produce the delisting. See also Amshoff v. United States, 228
F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1956) (no invalidating retroactivity, but new policy treated by the
court in the end as required by law) ; Pederson v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956),
and Smith v. Sutton, 135 F. Supp. 805 (D.D.C. 1955) (invalid retroactivity). The
retroactivity discussed in certain other cases involved the development of new policies,
reaching back in time, instead of changes in policies previously established. SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) ; NLRB v. Stoller, 207 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1953) ;
NLRB v. Pierce Bros., 206 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1953). The decision in Arizona Grocery
Co. v. A.T. & S.F.R.R., 284 U.S. 370 (1932), invalidated a retroactive change in a policy
previously embodied in "legislative" action by the Interstate Commerce Commission. As
to retroactivity of statutes see Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEx. L.
REv. 229 (1927), 6 TEX. L. Rav. 409 (1928) ; Stimson, The Supreme Court and the Con-
stitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REv. 692 (1960).
53. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); NLRB v. Olaa Sugar
Co., 242 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1957) ; WIRL Television Co. v. United States, 253 F.2d 863
(D.C. Cir. 1958) ; Optical Workers Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Sun
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of the courts to sustain administrative actions based on changeable poli-
cies varies in direct relation to the extent to which the public interest en-
trusted to the agency is deemed to outweigh the element of private in-
terest in the situations covered.54
AGENCY INITIATIVE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
To secure the ends for which they are established, administrative
agencies typically have the duty to proceed affirmatively in the matters
with which they are concerned, instead of waiting, as the courts do, until
proceedings are brought before them.5" There are exceptions, of course,
such as licensing, arbitration, and claims-adjudication proceedings, in
which application must be made in order to set agency processes in motion.
Under the Federal Social Security Act, for example, even though the
agency administering old age and survivors insurance has records which in
many instances show the insured worker's entitlement to benefits when his
retirement becomes known, his failure to file an application, even when ex-
cusable, results in loss of benefits.56 Even such agencies often have powers
of promotion or oversight, designed to extend the benefits they dispense to
those who should receive them. The Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare has "the duty of studying and making recommendations as
to the most effective methods of providing economic security through so-
cial insurance, and as to legislation and matters of administrative pol-
icy. . . . "" The same agency uses extensive methods of publicity to call
the attention of persons insured under the old age and survivors insur-
ance system to their rights. Under workmen's compensation laws settle-
ments between claimants and employers or their insurance carriers must
typically be filed with the agency and are subject to its approval for con-
Oil Co. v. FPC 256 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1958) ; In Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535
(1959), an order dismissing a Federal employee on valid grounds, but retroactively cover-
ing the period since a previous invalid dismissal, purportedly under a different statute,
was held invalid by a divided court.
54. Local Union No. 12 v. NLRB, 189 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1951). Compare Pederson
v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956) and Smith v. Sutton, 135 F. Supp. 805 (D.D.C.
1955).
55. Bandeen v. Howard, 299 S.V.2d 249 (Ky. 1956), cert. den. 355 U.S. 813 (1957).
If the criminal courts are considered to embrace the grand juries attached to them, as
in a sense they do, these courts as institutions do not always "wait" for prosecutions to
be brought, but possess an arm for instituting them.
56. Coy v. Folsom, 228 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1955) ; Jacobson v. Folsom, 158 F. Supp.
281 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Under the workmen's compensation acts a claim must be filed in
the manner prescribed by statute in order to permit benefits to be awarded, unless, under
some laws, good cause is shown, Ladwig v. Travelers Ins. Co., 254 F.2d 840 (5th Cir.
1958), or the employer fails to file timely objection with the commission, 44 Stat. 1432(1927), 33 U.S.C.A. § 913, or, under other laws, prejudice does not result, In re Clif-
ford's Case, 337 Mass. 129, 148 N.E.2d 390 (1958). See generally 2 LARSON, THE LAW
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 78.00-78.45 (1952).
57. 49 Stat. 636 (1935) as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 902.
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formity to the statute, instead of being accepted merely because they are
satisfactory to the parties." The power to initiate investigations and to
use compulsory process to secure evidence is commonly conferred upon
administrative agencies.
Many agencies have authority to initiate proceedings to enforce ob-
ligations owing to the government, such as taxes or military service; to
suspend or revoke licenses; or to require, by order, the observance of
agency-administered laws." Not infrequently the agencies are aided by
registration or reporting requirements resting upon the individuals con-
cerned, such as the duty to register for military service, to file tax re-
turns, or to report current business operations; but active steps to secure
compliance with the governing law may be taken by the agencies, whether
or not the required information has been filed.6"
Some specialized agencies must, like prosecuting attorneys, proceed
through the courts. The Wage-Hour Administrator, for example, who
issues regulations and makes inspections under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, must bring a court action to secure an order for compliance.61 More
often the agency may initiate a proceeding before itself-sometimes of
its own motion, sometimes only after a charge of violation of law has
been made to it by an outside interest. All of the agencies regulating
rates may initiate proceedings, looking to rate adjustments, before them-
selves. On the other hand the authority of the National Labor Relations
Board to file a complaint concerning an unfair labor practice comes into
play only after a charge has been filed with it." An agency proceeding
may lead to a regulation or order which is legally binding and is enforce-
able in a court proceeding for a penalty or for a court order which is in
58. 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 56, 8§ 82.00-82.43.
59. A.G. Coam. REPT., pp. 13-17, 19-20.
60. Under the Federal income tax law, whether or not a return has been filed, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue may take steps to collect the amount he finds to be
due from the taxpayer. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6020 (b).
61. 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 217. Condemnation proceedings for articles
shipped in violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act must be brought in court, 52
Stat. 1044 (1938) as amended, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 334-337; and so must proceedings to con-
demn merchandise, vessels, or vehicles worth more than $1,000, which have been in-
volved in violations of the customs laws, 46 Stat. 755 (1930), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1610.
62. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(b). Compare 3 BENYA IN, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE ADyuDIcATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 22 (1942) (complaints against
milk dealers). The Federal Trade Commission, possessing similar powers with relation
to unfair methods of competition, may proceed "[w]henever it shall have reason to be-
lieve" that such methods are being used and "if it shall appear to the Commission that
a proceeding . . . would be in the interest of the public," 38 Stat. 719 (1914) as amended,
15 U.S.C.A. § 45(b) ; but it usually does so after a "[confidential] application for com-
plaint" has been filed with it under its rules of practice. A.G. CoM., MONOGRAPH ON THE
F.T.C., S. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d sess., Part 6, pp. 4-5 (1940).
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turn enforceable by contempt process ;" or it may be enforceable through
direct action by the agency, such as the destruction of a nuisance which
has been ordered abated, or the seizure of property for taxes. "
No matter how an agency proceeding may have been initiated,
whether by an interested private party or by the agency, the responsi-
bility for reaching a correct result rests upon the agency. The governing
statute is to be given effect, and the outcome of the proceeding is not to
be left to the energy, ability, or will of litigants."5 Once begun, many
proceedings cannot be halted without agency consent, however they may
have been started, except sometimes where they involve applications for
licenses or benefits. 6 No matter how much reliance may routinely be
placed on private parties, responsibility for the ascertainment of facts, as
well as for the interpretation of law and the development of policy, rests
ultimately upon the agency, whether or not a proceeding is agency-
63. In 1938 the orders of the Federal Trade Commission under the Federal Trade
Commission Act were changed from the latter category to the former, 52 Stat. 1028,
15 U.S.C.A. § 45(g) (1), and in 1959 the same change was made as to orders under the
Clayton Act, 73 Stat. 243, 15 U.S.C.A. § 21.
64. 68A Stat. 783, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6331. Property is forfeited administratively, after
opportunity for hearing, by collectors of customs when they act to declare forfeited and
to sell merchandise, vehicles, and vessels worth less than $1,000, which they find to have
been involved in violations of the customs laws. 46 Stat. 755 (1930) as amended, 19
U.S.C.A. § 1609.
66. Even where the burden of proof in the sense of risk of non-persuasion is on a
private party, an agency decision against him because of want of evidence may be re-
versed where it appears that evidence exists. Martineau v. Director, 329 Mass. 44, 106
N.E.2d 420 (1952). In proceedings in the Interstate Commerce Commission and cer-
tain other agencies, begun by private complaint, the agency has discretion whether to
proceed. 24 Stat. 383 (1887) as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 13(1) (I.C.C.) ; 48 Stat. 1071
(1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 204 (F.C.C.) ; 52 Stat. 1018 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. § 642 (C.A.B.).
Cf. Pan American-Grace Airways v. CAB, 178 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1949), applying §
401(h) of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 989 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. § 481(h). Cer-
tain rules of practice of the Department of Agriculture provide specifically that an ap-
plicant to the Department for a complaint to issue has no subsequent standing in any
proceedings that may follow, unless permitted to intervene. 9 C.F.R. § 202.3(c) (1949)
17 id. § 0.3(b) ; 18 id. § 0.53(b).
66. NLRB v. Kobritz, 193 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1951), pet. to vacate den. 201 F.2d 156
(1953); NLRB v. Robinson, 251 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1958) ; News Printing Co. v. NLRB,
231 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. den. 352 U.S. 845 (1956) ; NLRB v. Local 450, 275
F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1960). Rule of Practice 1.312(c) of the Federal Communications
Commission, 47 C.F.R. § 1.312(c), provides that an application for broadcasting facili-
ties may not be withdrawn after it has been designated for hearing, unless the Commis-
sion approves. See also Federal Power Commission, Rule of Practice 1.11 (d), 18
C.F.R. § 1.11 (d). A similar rule of the Securities and Exchange Commission with re-
spect to registration statements for securities was held invalid by a divided Court in
Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936). Compare Columbia General Investment Corp. v.
SEC, 265 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1959), and see the discussion of this problem, 10 AD. LAW
BULL. at 207-218 (1958). Agencies may, of course, decide in a bona-fide exercise of dis-
cretion to defer to private interests. See C.A.B. Order Ser. No. E-7376, 17 C.A.B. P.EP.
230 (1953), discussed in Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A
Reevaluation, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1111-1112 (1954).
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initiated. 7
It follows that normally an agency is not to proceed for the mere
benefit of private interests, at their behest. Indications that an agency
has lent itself to securing private advantage for its own sake to a private
party may lead to judicial reversal of its action.6" Nevertheless, public
reasons have caused certain administrative tribunals, as well as courts, to
be established for the vindication of socially important private interests;
and the Supreme Court has referred in this connection to "a private ad-
ministrative remedy" before the Interstate Commerce Commission for
the violation by a carrier of its statutory duty.6" Where a statute is
directed to checking private economic power by strengthening a "counter-
vailing [private] power," such as the power of organized labor as a check
on big business, the line between public and mere private interest be-
comes especially difficult to draw. The agency may theri be able to rest
its action largely on the initiative of the favored group as a supposedly
adequate guide to where the public interest lies.7 Referenda by farmers
to decide whether certain crop controls shall go into effect are an example
of identification by the legislature itself of private will with public in-
terest,71 which is similar in this respect to local option laws. An agency
may not, it has been held, allow its judgment of the public interest, even
in a discretionary matter, to override cavalierly a private interest such as
that of a workmen's compensation claimant, to which the governing stat-
ute has lent support ;72 and where strong equities in favor of a private
party have been created through reliance on an agency, as was the case
where an employee testified adversely to his employer while under a Na-
tional Labor Relations Board subpoena, the agency may be bound to
protect his interest.7 1
67. Martineau v. Director, supra note 65; Pacific Inland Tariff Bureau v. United
States, 129 F. Supp. 472, 134 F. Supp. 210 (D. Ore. 1955) ; Cantlay & Tanzola v. United
States, 115 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
68. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929); Flynn & Emrich Co. v. FTC, 52 F.2d
836 (4th Cir. 1931). Compare Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1942).
69. FTC v. Klesner, supra note 68, quoted in Amalgamated Utility Workers v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 269 (1940). See generally Jaffe, The Public
Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HARv. L. REv. 720 (1946).
70. The National Labor Relations Board, for example, adhered for a while to the
policy of not considering objections to acts allegedly interfering with the fairness of a
collective bargaining election, when the objections might have been made before the
election but were not. This policy was changed in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
101 N.L.R.B. 1118 (1952), cited in NLRB v. National Container Corp., 211 F.2d 525
(2d Cir. 1954).
71. See 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1304(b), 1321(d), 1336, 1343, 1354(b), 1358(b).
72. Evans v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 253 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1958) (agency held
not entitled to compel workmen's compensation payee to submit to hazardous surgical
operation).
73. Pederson v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956). See also Marine Engineers
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Zeal in the public interest on the part of agencies is hard to main-
tain. Among other means of securing it, the courts sometimes apply a
spur to compel agency consideration of essential public aspects of matters
coming before them." The principal reliance in securing agency alert-
ness must be certain political, organizational, and management measures
which the agencies, the chief executive, and the legislature have at their
command.
VOLUME OF BUSINESS
It would be natural for agencies which are open to private applica-
tions or complaints in numerous matters, often of lesser moment, or
which are charged with a duty to carry out laws affecting multitudes of
transactions, to build up an impressive volume of proceedings. Such is
in fact the case; and a large volume of business, handled by numerous
personnel, is a leading characteristic of administrative agencies, especially
in the Federal Government."
The great bulk of agency operations, whether commenced upon
agency initiative or otherwise, consists not of proceedings akin to those
in court or in a deliberative assembly, but of a variety of informal pro-
cesses. Some of these are required by statute, such as proceedings on
license applications. Others, such as the receipt and scrutiny of reports
from regulated businesses, may result from agency regulations issued
under general statutory authority. A flow of business involving, not dis-
putes, but inspections, processing of applications, rulings on the basis of
correspondence, and instructions to secure compliance with statutory re-
quirements, is handled as a matter of course in the discharge of agency
functions.
The nature of the activities administrative agencies carry on indi-
cates that the agencies are in many ways analogous to business organiza-
tions rather than to other institutions of government. Insurance com-
panies, the rate departments of transportation companies, firms of ac-
countants, the adjustment bureaus of department stores, law offices, and
scientific laboratories are more like many administrative agencies than
are legislatures and courts. It is therefore misleading to assume a simi-
Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. den. 346 U.S. 819 (1953)
(Board settlement with respondent, without hearing or consent of charging party, held
invalid).
74. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 360 U.S. 378
(1959) ; Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 253 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1958) ; C.J. Community
Services, Inc. v. FCC, 246 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Pacific Inland Tariff Bureau v.
United States, and Cantlay & Tanzola v. United States, supra note 67. Compare Lucken-
bach S.S. Co. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd 347 U.S. 984
(1954).
75. A.G. Com. REPT. 18, 314-326.
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larity between the multitudinous determinations of agencies and those of
the courts, and to assert, as has so often been done, that the sheer volume
of agency deciding functions would preclude the assignment of these
functions to the courts. It is true that it requires an adequate volume of
a particular variety of business to warrant the creation of a specialized
agency to handle it; but the nature of the methods required for most of
this business, rather than its amount, accounts for its not being handled
judicially. It would, on the other hand, if it were desirable, be entirely
feasible to separate many of the controversies that grow out of agency
operations and assign them to judicial tribunals instead of letting the
agency handle them, just as disputes that arise in private affairs are car-
ried to court. Additional courts, but not an impossible number of them,
would be needed.
Even the exercise of discretion in the sense defined in this article
could frequently be entrusted to judicial bodies; for discretion in this
sense is not completely foreign to the courts, being often exercised when
injunctions are framed, sentences in criminal cases are imposed, alimony
is awarded, and child custody and adoption cases are decided. In so far
as courts in the judicial branch could not be assigned certain controver-
sies because they are deemed nonjudicial, administrative courts which,
unlike agencies, would be free of other duties, could be established to
handle them."0 The number of courts would, of course, have to be in-
creased. The wisdom of such a possible separation of disputes from the
bulk of administrative proceedings is an important question requiring
discussion.
USE OF INFORMAL METHODS
It follows from the characteristics of the work administrative agen-
cies have to do that the methods they employ must in large part be of a
business, managerial, and professional nature, rather than conforming
in character to the methods of courts. Accountants, economists, engi-
neers, scientists, and legal advisors carry on within an agency in largely
the same manner as elsewhere, serving to some extent as witnesses or
advocates during adversary proceedings, but much more commonly act-
76. Largely for historical reasons, the assignment to the courts in the judicial
branch of some kinds of administrative determinations, even in controverted proceedings,
is deemed to violate the separation of powers. In the Federal system the Court of
Claims, Customs Court, and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which probably
are not judicial courts in the constitutional sense despite recent Congressional declara-
tions that they are, 67 Stat 226 (1953), 70 Stat. 532 (1956), 72 Stat. 848 (1948), 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 171, 251, 211, decide matters of this nature. Cf. National Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S.
553 (1933) ; Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
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ing in the manner which is customary for their kinds of work. Where
private interests are involved, these informal methods, employed in
agency proceedings, 7 are part of the subject matter of administrative law.
To secure accuracy and fairness in these informal proceedings a
variety of management methods are employed. These include (1) writ-
ten regulations, instructions, or directives from those near the top of the
administrative hierarchy to those lower down; (2) oral and written in-
terchange of data and views among collaborating personnel; (3) review
by superior officers or by designated reviewers of the determinations of
subordinates before these finally take effect; and (4) "spot checking" of
a sample of the determinations made by a staff, not for the purpose of
changing results, but for the purpose of diagnosing errors and taking
corrective steps for the future. In the great bulk of the matters deter-
mined by many agencies the conformity of results to statutory require-
ments and the satisfaction of affected interests turn on the success of
these methods and on the quality and training of the personnel employed,
as well as on the availability, when dissatisfaction arises, of formal re-
view proceedings and of opportunity for conferences between the private
persons concerned and agency representatives.
Communication between agency personnel and those affected by
agency proceedings, before final decisions are reached, is an indispens-
able safeguard to accuracy and fairness. The Federal Administrative
Procedure Act secures such communication by providing that "[e]very
party shall be accorded the right to appear in person or by or with counsel
or other duly qualified representative in any agency proceeding," and that
"[s] o far as the orderly conduct of public business permits, any interested
person may appear before the agency or its responsible officers or em-
ployees for the presentation, adjustment, or determination of any issue,
request, or controversy in any proceeding (interlocutory, summary, or
otherwise) or in connection with any agency function."78  Much of the
time of lawyers engaged in practice before administrative agencies is
taken up with communications, conferences, and appearances of an in-
formal variety."9 Similarly, agency personnel must spend a large part of
their time in the same manner. To increase the assurance that these in-
formal contacts will be available before determinations are made, the Act
77. As to the validity of wholly informal methods of inquiry in the absence of statu-
tory procedural requirements, see U.S. ex rel. Roop v. Douglass, 19 D.C. (8 Mackey)
99, 112 (1890) : "As no mode of inquiry is prescribed by the statute, the Commissioners
are, by implication, free to adopt any that may reasonably be used in attaining the end
in view."
78. A.P.A. § 6(a).
79. HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER 73-74, 92-114 (1952).
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further provides that "[e] very agency shall separately state and currently
publish in the Federal Register (1) descriptions of its central and field
organization including delegations by the agency of final authority and
the established places at which, and methods whereby, the public may se-
cure information or make submittals or requests; [and] (2) statements
of the general course and method by which its functions are channeled
and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal or
informal procedures available as well as forms and instructions as to the
scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations." Further, "No
person shall in any manner be required to resort to organization or pro-
cedure not so published." Each agency must also publish in the Federal
Register not only its substantive regulations authorized by law, but also
"statements of general policy or interpretations formulated and adopted
by the agency for the guidance of the public.8"
By providing the facilities and personnel of administrative agencies
and enacting the foregoing provisions for agency operation in relation to
private interests, Congress has created informal processes for agency de-
terminations, including discretionary determinations, that could be relied
upon altogether at the administrative level, to the exclusion of formal
proceedings, if adequate judicial review were provided. Such is in fact
the only provision made at both the Federal and State levels for some
highly important decisions, such as those which determine the right to
operate as a national"1 or state 2 bank, the issuance of many occupational
licenses, 3 the violation of occupational restrictions in some situations, 4
the seaworthiness of vessels, entitling them to sail from port,8" the use of
various resources of the national forests," income tax liability," subject
to review in the Tax Court, and the patentability of an invention.8 In-
formal methods unaccompanied by opportunity for formal hearings have
80. A.P.A. § 3(a).
81. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 26-27, 35.
82. 2 BENJAMIN, ADMfINIsTRATIvE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEw YORK
13-16 (1942).
83. 4 id. pp. 100-108, 129-130, 136-137, 141-143; compare pp. 16-22. Cf. Byse, Op-
portunity to be Heard in License Issuance, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 57 (1952).
84. 4 BENJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 82 at 149-153.
85. A.G. Com. REPr. 36.
86. 36 C.F.R. § 211.2(b) (1960). Paragraph (a), since 1957, provides a formal
hearing procedure in appeals involving rights under contracts of sale of timber and cer-
tain other resources of commercial value.
87. Marrs, Procedure in Practice before the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 19 U.
Cimc. L. RE V. 460 (1950) ; Spencer, Income Tax Controversies with the Internal Revenue
Agent in Charge, 64 HARV. L. REv. 547 (1951). The initial determination on the basis
of the taxpayer's return is made by calculating machine.
88. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 131-134; 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.106, 1.111-1.113, 1.133, 1.191-1.198, as
amended (1960). The procedure of the Patent Office has been largely formalized, but
along lines that vary widely from the judicial process.
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been denominated the "pure" administrative process.89
It has been suggested that administrative proceedings would give
greater satisfaction on the whole, because of the greater speed that would
result, if all of them could be carried on as the agencies saw fit, subject
to full court trials later concerning determinations of a "judicial" charac-
ter, if court review were sought.9" On the continent of Europe many
administrative powers are carried out in this manner, and full review is
afforded in administrative courts which are outside the agencies but sepa-
rate from the judicial courts." Because of the nationalization of indus-
tries which in the United States are regulated, administrative determina-
tions affecting private parties in Europe do not commonly entail the vast
economic consequences which often attach in this country. In England
the courts have held to a varied extent that a formal hearing must be ac-
corded at the stage where initial administrative determinations are made. 2
In that country9" and to a lesser extent in the United States, provision is
sometimes made for review of informal agency determinations by quasi-
89. GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 61 (1941). For a plea
in behalf of income tax administration more nearly exclusively by such methods see May,
Accountants and Income Taxation, 47 COLUm. L. REV. 377 (1947).
90. John Foster Dulles, testifying before a panel of the Attorney General's Com-
mittee on Administrative Procedure, Transcript of Proceedings, July 12, 1940, pp. 89-
100. In his later testimony before Congress on proposed legislation, Mr. Dulles con-
fessed his inability to devise a general formula whereby determinations judicial in nature
could be distinguished from others. He suggested that, rather, the statutes governing
particular agencies should specify which were which. Hearings on S. 674, 675, and 918,
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Jvdiciary, 77th Cong., 1st sess.,
Part III, 1155-1156 (1941). See also the testimony of William J. Dempsey in id., pp.
1170-1175.
91. SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD
207-211, 195 (1954). There are special French tribunals, largely engaged in ad-
ministering benefit payments to individuals, in which quasi-judicial procedures are avail-
able early in the administrative stage. Riesenfeld, The French System of Administrative
Justice: A Model for American Law?, 18 B.U.L. REv. 48, 400, 715, at 737-743. In Ger-
many even more such tribunals were established on the national level prior to the Nazi
regime; the awarding of patents, for example, was handled by judicial processes. Uhl-
man & Rupp, The German, System of Administrative Courts, 31 ILL. L. REv. 847, 858-867
(1937). In Sweden administrative processes have long been patterned after judicial
processes, involving in that country a written procedure. Herlitz, Swedish Admninistra-
tive Law, 2 INT. & Comp. L.Q. 224, 231-234 (1953).
92. S.A. deSmith, The Right to a Hearing in English Administrative Law, 68
HARV. L. REV. 569 (1955). Mr. deSmith's article, which treats of judicial decisions con-
cerning the right to a hearing, may not stress sufficiently the large body of unchallenged
statutory provisions and administrative practice under which informal administrative
processes have been conducted throughout history. His subsequent book, of which the
article forms a chapter, takes full account of this factor. S. A. BE SMITH, JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 1-2, 17-18 (1959).
93. THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND EN-
QUIRIES, CMND. 218 (1957), at paras. 140-278, gives an account of both the appellate tri-
bunals and the tribunals of first instance in Great Britain. See also R. POLLARD, ADMIN-
ISTRATIvE TRIBUNALS AT WORK (1950), containing a detailed account of the operation
of some of these bodies.
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judicial tribunals established within the agency framework but largely
detached in actual operation, where more formal procedure prevails. The
Appeals Council in the American Old Age and Survivors Insurance sys-
tem94 operates in this way; and the Tax Court,9" Customs Court,96 and
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 7 are independent successors to
earlier intra-agency tribunals. State hearing tribunals in public assistance
and unemployment compensation administration are more closely linked
to the agencies which pass on applications initially; but they usually in-
volve another set of officials at the state level who review local deter-
minations on the basis of full hearings, and therefore supply an essen-
tially detached judgment.9" In a recent Michigan decision holding that
the Water Resources Commission must accord a record-type hearing in-
itially with regard to an anti-pollution order, the court appears to have
overlooked altogether a statutory provision for informal processes lead-
ing to an order, and for a subsequent formal hearing if requested.9
USE OF TRIAL-TYPE PROCESSES
In the United States a strong current, perhaps the main cur-
rent, of administrative procedural development has run in a different
direction. Formal hearing procedures are made available before in-
itial decisions are reached in many kinds of administrative proceed-
ings, on the theory that procedural safeguards are needed and that
it is better to seek sound decisions in the first instance than to rely more
largely on reviewing tribunals. If a workmen's compensation claim is
not settled, the initial administrative determination is based on the record
of an adversary hearing."' The same is true with regard to complaint
proceedings directed against regulated rates,'' cease-and-desist order pro-
ceedings,"0 2 and even some proceedings leading to the issuance of general
94. 53 Stat. 1368 (1939) as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(b) ; 20 C.F.R. §§ 403.709-
710, 422.6 (1949).
95. 68A Stat. 879 (1954), 26 U.S.C.A. § 7441.
96. 62 Stat. 899 (1948) as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 251.
97. 62 Stat. 899 (1948) as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 211; Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,
279 U.S. 438 (1929).
98. Scholz, Hcarings in Public Assistance, 11 Soc. SEC. BULL. 14 (1948); Public
Assistance Hearings, 13 id. 16; BuR. OF EMPLOYMENT SEC., COMPARISON OF STATE UN-
EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS 125-127 (1958).
99. L. A. Darling Co. v. Water Resources Comm'n, 341 Mich. 654, 67 N.W.2d 890
(1955).
100. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 217 (1936).
101. 24 Stat. 384 (1887) as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 15(a) (I.C.C.) ; 48 Stat. 1071
(1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 204 (F.C.C.); 52 Stat. 1018 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. § 642(d)
(C.A.B.).
102. 38 Stat. 719 (1914) as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(b) (F.T.C.) ; 61 Stat. 146
(1947) as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (b), (c) (N.L.R.B.).
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regulations."' In many proceedings in which there may be initial ad-
ministrative decisions based on reports or requests, without hearings,
such as a decision to permit a filed rate to go into effect0 or to issue a
license on the basis of an unopposed application,' the development of
opposition from private sources or of serious question on the part of the
agency results in formal hearing procedures at an early stage.'
In this country, then, formal procedures are available in many pro-
ceedings before an administrative determination is made, or become avail-
able as soon as serious questions arise-subject almost always to settle-
ments which the agency concerned and the private parties may be able to
reach informally.' The tendency to provide such procedures reaches its
ultimate expression in some of the state administrative procedure acts
which secure the right to a trial-type hearing in any agency "adjudica-
tion," broadly defined to include all determinations of personal or prop-
erty rights, privileges, or immunities.' 8 It is not recorded that the right
to a trial-type hearing has been claimed or accorded in connection with
such matters as the privilege of using state park facilities or the receipt
of an "A" grade in a given course in a state teachers college; but there
seems to be no exception to the right to a trial-type hearing as it is be-
stowed in these statutory provisions. Under the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act opportunity for a trial-type hearing, to which specific pro-
cedural requirements set out in the Act apply, is accorded whenever the
statute under which the agency is proceeding requires a determination
"on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."'0 0
This ready infusion of trial-type processes into administrative pro-
103. A.G. Com. REPT. 108-111; Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative RIde-Mak-
ing, 52 HARv. L. Rnv. 259 (1938).
104. 24 Stat. 380, 384 (1887) as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 6, 15(7) ; 48 Stat. 1070(1934), 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 203, 204; ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 111 2/3, § 33 (1959) ; N.Y. Pun.
SERV. LAW, § 29.
105. 48 Stat. 1085, (1934) as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. § 309 (broadcasting licenses)
IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3024 (Burns 1951 as supplemented) (licenses generally); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. 8 154-67 (Page 1953) (licenses generally).
106. See notes 104 and 105 Fupra.
107. A.P.A. § 5(b) provides that in advance of hearing, "The agency shall afford
all interested parties opportunity for . . . the consideration of facts, arguments, offers
of settlement, or proposals of adjustment where time, the nature of the proceeding, and
the public interest permit." See also IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3025 (Burns 1951 as supple-
mented); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 536.086 (1957 Supp.).
108. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 154-62 to -67 (Page 1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
88 1710.2, 1710.31 (1951 Supp.); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-15 (1950). THE TASK FORCE
REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE OF THE COIISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT 170-172 (1955), contains a recom-
mendation that all adjudications not required to be preceded by opportunity for hearing
be accompanied by opportunity for review in formal hearings before intra-agency re-
view boards.
109. A.P.A. §§ 4(b), 5(a).
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ceedings, which often is called the "judicialization" of those proceedings,
results in part from the pressure of private groups to checkmate un-
wanted but inescapable regulation; but it is more basically the product of
a tendency to extend the ideal of due process in the judicial sense to all
proceedings in which private interests are at stake."' That ideal in its
modern form (which is by no means fully realized in many judicial pro-
ceedings, where lawyers may play upon the emotions, juries do not ex-
plain their verdicts, judges may fail adequately to explain their decisions,
and juries may proceed quite irrationally) has come to include a number
of significant elements. These are: (1) formulation of specific issues to
which a proceeding is to be directed; (2) presentation in hearings, which
are public except for special reasons, by the parties in interest, of all the
evidence to be used, with opportunity for each party to test the evidence
offered by others; (3) conduct of hearings by presiding officers who
maintain fairness through the exercise of adequate powers; (4) argu-
ment by the parties respecting the outcome; (5) objectivity on the part of
presiding and deciding officers; (6) rational decision of the issues on
the basis of the evidence presented, through the application of criteria
(consisting traditionally of doctrines of law) which are known in ad-
vance; (7) the right of assistance by counsel; (8) the availability of
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (9) adequate
explanation by the deciding authorities of their decisions, and (10) since
reportorial skills and modern recording devices have made it possible to
reproduce testimony, the creation of complete records of hearings."'
110. THE TASK FORCE REPORT supra, note 108, at 138, expressed the judgment that
"The more closely that administrative procedures can be made to conform to judicial
procedures, the greater the probability that justice will be attained in the administrative
process." A recent instance of this tendency is the development of safeguarded pro-
cedures, similar to those specified in A.P.A. §§ 7 & 8, in the grazing and public lands
determinations of the Department of the Interior. Important developments occurred in
procedural regulations in grazing cases issued in 1946, 11 Fed. Reg. 14496, 43 C.F.R.
§ 161.9 (1946 Cum. Supp.), which were revised in 1955, 20 Fed. Reg. 9912, 43 C.F.R.
§§ 161.9, 161.10 (Supp. 1960), and in a revision of the procedural regulations in land
cases, 21 Fed. Reg. 1860, 7623, 43 C.F.R. Parts 220, 221 (Supp. 1960). For explanations
and references to departmental decisions elaborating the changes see Reports of the Com-
inittee on Nratural Resources and Interior Matters of the A.B.A. Section of Administra-
tize Law, 5 AD. L. BULL. 125. See also Swenson, Administrative Procedure in the Bu-
reau of Land Management, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 257.
111. In England the concept of "natural justice" has been developed to embrace the
safeguards that are deemed essential when judicial and quasi-judicial procedures are
employed. The Committee on Ministers' Powers specified three elemnts of natural jus-
tice: (1) that "a man may not be judge in his own cause," (2) that there be a hearing
(not necessarily oral) after adequate notice, and (3) that parties be informed of the ba-
sis of the resulting decision, at least where an appeal lies to higher authority. REP., CIeD.
4060 (1932), p. 75 et seq. That English law has not, in the absence of a statutory right
of appeal, bestowed on private parties a right to disclosure of the reasons for adminis-
trative action, see S.A. DE S IITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIvE AcrioN 20
et seq. (1959). The judicial ideal of today is, of course, the result of a long process of
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With the availability of agency procedures largely embodying this
judicial ideal, problems have arisen with regard to accommodating these
procedures to the traditional agency methods. These problems often in-
volve issues as to whether given aspects of the judicial ideal shall prevail
in particular proceedings. Spreading evidence on the record of a hearing
may, for example, be time-consuming and may seem to the deciding
authorities to confer no benefit." 2 Demonstration of the falsity of
claims for a cancer cure, for example, may not require evidence in the
eyes of a tribunal of cancer specialists who, indeed, may be unwilling to
serve as members of the tribunal if they are required to spend long periods
of time in listening to such evidence."' The use of newly available in-
formation which is pertinent to a proceeding, if it is published between
the time of the hearing and the time of the decision, may seem desirable
to experts who keep up with their specialties, without any need to reopen
the hearing for the purpose of placing the information on the record."
Consultation with agency staff members who have knowledge and judg-
ment to contribute to a decision would certainly seem proper to an of fi-
cial who has the decision to formulate, even though the parties might like
to preclude such consultation unless they were invited to attend."' Hence
the judicial ideal or some extension of it comes into conflict from time
to time with a natural tendency toward self-reliance on the part of quali-
fied persons, as they go about their business in accustomed professional
ways. The need of judicial-type procedural correctives for this tendency,
where important private interests, such as the career of a professional
practitioner, are at stake, emerges strikingly in decided cases from time
evolution which started with procedures far different from those that are now deemed
essential. "It matters little for our purposes that these procedural features appeared,
historically, as more or less accidental phases of a scheme to minimize resort to the
blood feud and other forms of self-help as methods of redressing private injuries. The
ceremonial in jus vocatio of the Romans and the Royal Writ of the Norman kings have
developed into a formal system of notice and hearing because experience has shown that
contentious litigation can thus be disposed of with least sacrifice of individual and social
interests. The survival of legal institutions is more important than their origins." E.
PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE CO-MMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 376 (1928).
112. Difficulties surround formalized rule-making procedures especially. Goodrich,
Simplifying the Trial of Scientific Issues in Formal Ride-Making under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 8 FooD DRUG Cosm. L. J. 578 (1953), points up these
difficulties excellently but concludes that the formal requirements of the Act are
justified.
113. Cf. Smith v. Dept. of Registration and Education, 412 Ill. 332, 106 N.E.2d 722(1952) (administrative decision set aside).
114. Cf. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937)
(rate order set aside).
115. "Emphatically, . . . deciding officers should, except for proper use of official
notice and clerical help, confine their consideration strictly to matters of record pro-
duced during formal hearing." A.G. Com. REPT., p. 209 (Statement of Additional Views
and Recommendations).
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to time."' Even in the absence of strong pressure from judicial decisions
or outside group insistence, agency processes sometimes evolve into pro-
ceedings that afford procedural protections of a judicial type, simply be-
cause more satisfactory results are secured in this way."'
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND THE JUDICIAL IDEAL
The standard which guides agency staffs in performing their func-
tions is the "public interest." "Public interest" is to agency personnel what
"due process" is to lawyers." 8 Neither standard is at all precise. Each em-
braces a gTeat variety of specific interests and procedures, which give ef-
fect in particular proceedings to the governing ideal; but each ideal has de-
finable substance, embodying a fundamental value which is to be realized.
The public interest embraces the social good which governments exist to
secure, including the ends set forth in particular statutes, such as correc-
tion of economic abuse, extension of benefits to wage earners, or a pre-
scribed contribution to victory in war. Due process involves the right of
persons to be heard, so far as feasible, in all matters affecting their indi-
vidual interests, together with the objective weighing of relevant factors
by the deciding authority in reaching conclusions.
The ideals of public interest and due process are obviously not mu-
tually exclusive. Indeed, if decisions are really to serve the public in-
terest they must be attended by sufficient fairness and rationality to ren-
der them acceptable. Correlatively due process cannot be maintained ex-
cept by a government which has enough success in serving social inter-
ests to enable itself to endure. Hence the pursuit of agency objectives
cannot wisely be pushed to the length of overriding essential due process;
and due process cannot validly be required to the extent of paralyzing
important governmental operations. So much all would concede. Con-
flicts arise over questions of degree, as administrators pursue their ob-
jectives and lawyers attempt to provide procedural protections for the
private interests at stake.
116. See, for example, Menning v. Department of Registration and Educ., 14 Ill.
2d 553, 153 N.F_.2d 52 (1958).
117. See Swenson, Administrative Procedure in the Bureau of Land Management,
1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 257.
118. HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 23 (1936).
For an excellent discussion of the relation of administrative to legal viewpoints and a
suggestion that professional administration, distinguished from politics and legislation
on the one hand and law on the other, may become a third force, see Grundstein, Law and
the Morality of Administration, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 265 (1953). Compare SIssoN,
THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION 23-24 (1959): "There is no need for the
administrator to be a man of ideas. His distinguishing quality should be rather a cer-
tain freedom from ideas. The idealisms and the most vicious appetites of the populace
are equal before him. He should be prepared to bow before any wisdom whose mouth
is loud enough."
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The progress that has been made in administrative law results largely
from an accommodation of the administrative and the legal viewpoints.
Such an accommodation is rendered easier in proportion to the under-
standing which each group has of the interests the other is seeking to
serve, and the recognition by each that specific issues cannot be resolved
simply on the basis of phrases or formulas. The methods which are
practiced have always varied from one area of administration to an-
other, and must continue to do so. Some governmental ends, such as
taking possession of land, may be pursued swiftly,'19 while others require
a more leisurely pace;12 some applications for agency permission to con-
duct private activities get brief treatment with judicial approval, 2' while
others receive the full panoply of procedural protections. 22 The treat-
ment which any specific claim ought to receive is a matter of time, place,
and circumstance,'23 as well as of approximation of ideals.
Approached in this way, particular problems can be solved accept-
ably. To this end, both the dogmas of efficient administrative manage-
ment, such as often underlie the publications of governmental experts, 124
and the monolithic viewpoint that all administrative proceedings should
approximate judicial trials, which members of the legal profession some-
times express,' must yield to a more realistic approach.
INTERNAL DELEGATION AND COORDINATION OF FUNCTIONS
An agency's functions are commonly vested by statute in its director,
commissioner, secretary, or other head, or in its members or commission-
119. In re United States, 257 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1958). See also Ewing v. My-
tinger and Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of misbranded articles in com-
merce) ; Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (taking possession of financial institu-
tion); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 4. s. 589 (1931) (tax collection).
120. See note 2 supra.
121. See note 77 supra. License controls over exports, which have been in ef-
fect since before World War II, are exempted from the Administrative Procedure Act,
63 Stat. 9 (1949), 50 U.S.C.A. § 2027, and license applications are processed without
any right to a hearing, 15 C.F.R. Part 372 (1959 supp.). Denial of participation in ex-
port trade is subject, however, to administratively proscribed hearing procedures. Id.,
Part 382. As to the nature of the hearing accorded see the opinion of Tocker, Compli-
ance Comm'r, in Willi Farner, 10 PIKE & FISHER, AD. L.2d 553 (1960).
122. See note 106 supra.
123. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK
16-17 (1941) ; Byse, The Opportunity to Be Heard in License Issuance, 101 U. PA.
L. REV. 57, 101 (1952) ; Fuchs, in Symposium on Administrative Law, 9 AMER. L. ScH.
REV. 139, 143-144 (1939).
124. See, for example, the REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE MANAGEMENT (1937), commented on in Fuchs, Current Proposals for the Reorgani-
zation of Federal Regulatory Agencies, 16 TEx. L. REV. 335 (1938).
125. See, for example, SECOND COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE ExECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PRO-
CEDURE (1955), reviewed in Fuchs, The Hoover Commission and Task Force Reports on
Legal Services and Procedure, 31 IND. LJ. 1 (1955).
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ers as a body if more than one serves at the top. Upon these officials rests
the responsibility for the proper conduct of all of the agency's operations.
They may, accordingly, personally perform any act falling within the
agency's province unless a statute or, possibly, an unrevoked agency regu-
lation, establishing a specially safeguard procedure before subordinates,
provides otherwise. 1 The necessity for delegating authority in a large
agency is apparent, 27 since manifestly the agency heads cannot personally
attend to the multitude of matters which typically are entrusted to it.
Failure to resort to delegation may result in crippling delays or even a
breakdown in the agency's operations.
There are legal limits to delegation within an agency. These result
from the actual or assumed intention of the legislature to require that
certain significant agency actions be performed personally by the agency
head or heads." 8  It may be difficult to determine just which acts these
are; but it can scarcely be doubted that, for example, the members of a
regulatory commission are required either to render personally a decision
which the governing statute entrusts to the commission, or to hold them-
selves available to review it if objection is raised to the determination of
subordinates acting for them. The principle involved is usually stated
as one which forbids the delegation of final responsibility for "judicial"
acts or acts "judicial in nature. 1" 9  In other words, officials who are
126. U.S. ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) (Attorney General,
having provided for review of deportation orders by the Board of Immigration Appeals,
cannot influence the Board's decision while a case is pending) ; Service v. Dulles, 354
U.S. 363 (1957) (Secretary of State can by regulation delegate power to render final
decision favorable to officer in dismissal proceeding and thereby disable himself from
ordering dismissal after such a decision, even though statute confides the matter to his
"absolute discretion"). There is a general requirement that agencies observe their own
procedural regulations. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153 (1945).
127. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956) ; Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lbr. Co.,
331 U.S. 111 (1947) ; Lewis v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 10 (1958) ; Parish v. United States, 100
U.S. 500 (1879) ; Krug v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 245 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1957) ;
U.S. ex rel. Leong Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954), and U.S.
ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953) (authority to delegate upheld
for unstated reasons) ; Shafer v. United States, 229 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Nolde and
Horst Co. v. Helvering, 122 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1941); A.G. Com. REPT. 20-24.
DAvis, AminnlsmATIvE LAw TREATISE §§ 9.01, 9.02 (1958), contains an excellent brief
discussion of the problem and its legislative treatment.
128. Despite its obscure origin, the maxim, Delegata potestas non potest delegari
(delegated power may not be redelegated), dealt with in Duff and Whiteside's article of
that name, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 168 (1929), states a valid principle with regard to
the discharge of essential responsibilities by those who are entrusted with them.
Cf. Lewis v. NLRB, sapra note 127, at 15; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland 315 U.S. 357
(1942) ; Steiner v. Nelson, 259 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1958) ; Apice v. American Woolen Co.,
74 R.I. 425, 60 A.2d 865 (1948) ; Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Bd. v. Economy Cash
& Carry Cleaners, 143 Fla. 859, 197 So. 550 (1940).
129. Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887); Apice v. American Woolen
Co., supra note 128; Horsman Dolls, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 134
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designated to decide specific matters which are important to others, espe-
cially to persons outside of the government, must not foreclose themselves
from giving personal attention to these matters, if they are not of a rou-
tine nature. 3'
Where practical considerations seem to make it necessary that im-
portant matters be delegated completely, statutory provisions may bestow
the power of delegation on agency heads, leaving them with overall re-
sponsibility for results but permitting them to divest themselves per-
sonally of such specific tasks as they may see fit. Such statutory author-
ity may permit delegation to agency personnel without restriction,13' or
may be limited to designated officials. The Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare may delegate his authority in the administration of
the Old Age and Survivors Insurance system to subordinates.' The
Secretary of Agriculture may delegate his adjudicative functions under
the numerous regulatory acts he is called upon to administer to not more
than two specially designated officers.'33 Frequently the exercise of dele-
gated authority is validated by a presumption that the delegation, when
legally permissible, was duly made,' or that the action finally talen by a
subordinate was in fact that of the agency head. 5 Under the Presi-
dential Delegation Act the President is given express authority to dele-
gate his powers to officials appointed with the advice and consent of the
Senate;.36 but his authority to delegate a considerable range of powers
without statutory authorization has been recognized." 7
Delegation often does not involve transferring all the duties relating
N.J.L. 77, 45 A.2d 681 (1946), app. dismissed 329 U.S. 693 (1946); NLRB v. Elkland
Leather Co., 114 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1940), cert. den. 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
130. See Grundstein, Sub-Delegation of Administrative Authority, 12 GEo. WASH.
L. R v. 114, 148-152, 154, 188-189 (1945); Black, J., dissenting, in Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S. 524, 553-554 (1952).
131. See the reorganization plan provision involved in Glenzman v. Schaeffer, 143
F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd. 252 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir. 1958), dismissed as abated,
357 U.S. 347 (1958), and Greene v. Kern, 178 F. Supp. 201 (D.N.J. 1959) (delegation by
Postmaster General).
132. 53 Stat. 1371 (1939), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(1).
133. 54 Stat. 81 (1940), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 516a-516e. See also Robertson v. United
States, 285 Fed. 911 (D.C. Cir. 1922), and Bowling v. United States, 299 Fed. 438 (8th
Cir. 1924) (delegation by Secretary of the Interior pursuant to statutory authority).
134. Norris v. United States, 257 U.S. 77 (1921) ; Shafer v. United States, supra
note 127; In re Giacobbi, 32 F. Supp. 508 (N.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd. 111 F.2d 297; Fer-
guson v. Port Huron & Sarnia Ferry Co., 13 F.2d 489 (E.D. Mich. 1926); The John
Shillito Co. v. McClung, 51 Fed. 868 (6th Cir. 1892). Compare United States v.
Bakouros, 160 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
135. Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 194, 206 (1911) ; Tang Tun v.
Edsel, 223 U.S. 673, 682 (1912).
136. 65 Stat. 712 (1951), 3 U.S.C.A. § 301.
137. Hargett v. Summerfield, 243 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. den. 353 U.S. 970;
Updegraff v. Talbott, 221 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1955).
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to an entire matter to the same individual or group within an agency. It
may consist instead of transferring different aspects of a single matter
to different personnel. Various staff members may be required to re-
port to the deciding authority on specific facts involved in a proceeding;
or designated ones may, respectively, be selected to gather data for a
hearing, arrange the material for presentation, conduct the hearing, and
recommend a decision after the hearing has been held. The validity of
the delegation, even without express statutory authority, of functions
which prepare the way for final decisions by agency heads has been sus-
tained." 8 The art of administering a large agency consists to a consider-
able extent, therefore, not only of wise delegation of authority, but also
of skillful correlation of the work of the subordinates to whom partial
delegations have been made. In this respect the task of administrators
differs radically from that of legislators and judges, whose actions per-
taining to their offices must be largely their own, with only such aid as
personal assistants can render.
Within agencies that draw on more than one kind of expertness,
delegation by agency heads is necessary to invoke the varieties of expert-
ness which should be brought to bear. Different aspects of the same
matters must then be delegated to different staff experts, so as to secure
the data and the judgment which these different individuals can supply.
The Federal Communications Commission, for example, formerly dele-
gated the duty of reporting on license applications to its engineering, ac-
counting, and legal staffs, and now calls for reports from similar groups
of experts within divisions of the Commission."' Each division handles
a single type of communications operation, such as broadcasting or wire
services. Other agencies proceed in much the same way.1"'
138. NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co., 357 U.S. 1, 7 (1958); Monongahela Bridge Co.
v. United States, 216 U.S. 177 (1910) ; La Porte v. Bitker, 145 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1944) ;
Southern Garment Mfrs. Ass'n v. Fleming, 122 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ; Plapao Lab.
v. Farley, 92 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ; cf. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481
(1936) ; Appeals of Port Murray Dairy Co., 6 N.J. Super. 285, 71 A.2d 208 (1950).
139. MONOGRAPH OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMIITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEDURE ON THE FEDERAL COMUONICATIONS COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong.,
3d sess., Part 3, 8-13 (1940). The Commission's staff has since been reorganized along
"functional" lines which place the various categories of experts in bureaus related to the
different types of communications services; but the essential process of collaboration is
not altered by this change. See the Commission's 18th Annual Report (1952), pp. 9-17,
and 25th Annual Report (1959), p. 19. KINTNER, THE REVITALIZED FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, PROCEEDINGS A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEcTION 189, 195 (August, 1955), gives an
account of a different type of reorganization of that agency.
140. Additional monographs of the Attorney General's Committee include accounts
of agency methods of considering the matters that come before them, and may be found
in the remaining twelve parts of the document cited in the preceding footnote and in the
fourteen parts of S. Doc. No. 10, 78th Cong., 1st sess. (1941). Although the formal pro-
ceedings of the agencies have changed substantially as a result of the enactment of the
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The kind of intra-agency delegation which is of greatest significance
for administrative law creates a division of labor covering the successive
steps in a formal agency proceeding. These are: (1) initiation of the
proceeding by the issuance of an agency complaint or by a notice that a
license application or a newly filed public utility rate will be questioned;
(2) subsequent investigation of the issues involved; (3) negotiations for
an agreement, which may be undertaken; (4) the presentation of evi-
dence at a hearing; (5) the conduct of the hearing; (6) the formulation
of an initial or recommended decision; (7) the consideration of argu-
ments of the parties before final decision; and (8) the rendering of that
decision. Each step builds on the preceding ones, and each makes its con-
tribution to the outcome. Some call for zeal in ferreting out evidence
or advocating a policy; others involve a high degree of objectivity.
These qualities must coexist among the members of a single staff, and
there is danger that one quality may displace another which is especially
needed at a particular stage. If zeal prevails when objectivity should
dominate, unfairness will result; if a sense of detachment permeates the
agency as a whole, the public interest is likely to suffer. Much discus-
sion of administrative procedure reform concerns the nature and effects
of the division of labor within agencies, involving the foregoing stages
of formal proceedings.1 4'
ANONYMITY AND RiESPONSIBILITY IN AGENCY OPERATIONS
The delegation that takes place within an agency, coupled with the
continued responsibility of agency heads for the entire complex of agency
operations, leads frequently to the practice of having officials act in the
name of the agencies they serve or in the name of the agency heads, with-
out disclosure of the identity of those who, within the agency, took part in
determining the action. The consequent feeling on the part of many per-
sons affected has been stated in a classic utterance of the chairman of the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure:
[T]he agency is one great obscure organization with which
the citizen has to deal. It is absolutely amorphous. He pokes
it in one place and it comes out another. No one seems to have
specific authority; a metaphysical omniscient brooding thing
Administrative Procedure Act, these monographs continue to reflect with substantial
accuracy the methods by which the agencies give consideration to a wide range of prob-
lems.
141. The writer proposes to deal with current discussions of reform in articles to
be published.
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which sort of floats around in the air and is not a human being.
That is what is baffling.
142
Modern legislation.4 applicable to agency proceedings in which for-
mal hearings are accorded requires, by contrast, that the final action and
in many situations certain preliminary steps, such as the preparation of
an initial or recommended decision, be taken by the agency heads or other
identified officials, such as hearing officers, with whom the affected
parties may deal.' The great bulk of ordinary matters in an agency, as
to which a formal hearing is not available or is not demanded, continues
to be carried on anonymously by personnel who function as a group, with
free exchange of information and views among them and no right of
affected persons to be informed of the content of this exchange or the
identity of those who carry it on. There are few judicially enforceable
safeguards against error in this process. Instead, the agency employs
administrative checks and is responsible politically to higher executive
and legislative authority and, in a democracy, to the people.
The significance of agency political responsibility, which, of course,
does not operate through judicial channels, was noted in two of the
opinions of the House of Lords in a famous case. There it was held that
no legal requirement existed for a property owner, whose tenement was
declared unfit for habitation, to have received an opportunity to offer
testimony before the final deciding body or to see the report of the in-
spector who had conducted an informal hearing in the locality, which the
agency took into account in reaching its decision.' 4' The decision was
issued in the name of the minister at the head of the agency. Viscount
Haldane pointed out in his opinion that the "Minister . . . is directly
responsible to Parliament."' 40  Lord Shaw stressed that the Minister "be-
comes answerable in Parliament for every departmental act . . . This is
142. Hearings on S. 674, 675, and 918 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
77th Cong., 1st sess. 807 (1941).
143. By way of exception to earlier practice, the procedure of the Patent Office
has traditionally secured personalized consideration of applications by examiners. Al-
though statutory functions in the initial consideration of patent applications have been
conferred on the Commissioner (66 Stat. 801 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 131) the practice
has been for each application to be assigned to a division of examiners and, in turn, to
a primary examiner with whom the applicant has dealt and by whom the initial deter-
mination has been made. 37 C.F.R. § 1.101 et seq.; 2 VALKER, PATENTS 827-833; (Del-
ler's ed. 1937) ; 2 Rowx soN, PATENTS 192 (1890). See also Steinmetz v. Allen,
192 U.S. 543, 563-566 (1904). The concept of "jurisdiction" of examiners and appellate
authorities within the Patent Office has arisen. McCRADY, PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE
174, 208, 258 (1928). Variation among the attitudes of different examiners and
divisions of the Patent Office has been noted and stressed as important to the practi-
tioner. 1 HoPicINs, LAW OF PATENTS 130-133 (1911).
144. A.P.A. §§ 7, 8, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1006, 1007.
145. Local Gov't Bd. v. Arlidge, [1915], A.C. 120.
146. Id. at 133.
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the general rule, acknowledged and familiar, of departmental action and
responsibility."1'4 7
In relying so heavily upon ministerial responsibility the Law Lords
undoubtedly had in mind the practice of Parliamentary interrogation of
ministers, which prevails in England. Under that practice the minister
responsible for an agency's action is required to submit to questioning
with regard to it by members of the House of Commons. 4 s A person
who feels aggrieved by a decision may request interrogation of the min-
ister by his representative in Parliament.'49 The nearest equivalents in
this country are criticism of administrative action in legislative debates
and investigation by legislative committees.'
Even in England effective legislative attention to specific adminis-
trative action is likely to be confined to instances of alleged abuse that
can be dramatized, or situations in which significant principles appear
on the surface to be at stake. Hence, generally speaking, administrative
responsibility to legislative authority cannot be relied upon as a safe-
guard against error or abuse in the bulk of proceedings affecting private
persons and property. Sheer want of time would preclude more than
occasional legislative consideration of particular cases. An additional
obstacle to effective legislative control of agencies lies in the technical
character of a large part of administration. Even a reviewing court,
having access to the administrative record and the duty to examine it,
may find it difficult to comprehend the mysteries of such matters as
transportation rates, wireless communication, or the chemistry of foods,
so as to exercise its powers effectively. Legislators and the over-all
executive are likely to be still more handicapped. If, therefore, effective
safeguards are to be established in relation to administrative functions,
they must be incorporated quite largely into the administrative proceed-
ings themselves, or else operate through judicial review. Nevertheless
the political responsibility of an agency is very real, and it operates with
some effectiveness, even in this country, to secure a reduction of abuses
and, upon occasion, to apply a corrective to particular proceedings.'
147. Id. at 136.
148. GRIFFITH & STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 24, 200, 208-209
(2d ed. 1957).
149. PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 153 (1952).
150. See generally CARE, CONCERNING ENGLISH ADmINISTRATIVE LAw 11-15 (1941).
151. In 1958 the Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce gave attention, with much attendant publicity, to
improper influences on certain determinations of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion and other agencies. Even though these were "independent" agencies, not subject to
immediate control by the chief executive, the Attorney General called the attention of the
Supreme Court to the likelihood that the type of influence in question had played a part
in certain determinations then before the Court for possible review. The Court took no-
FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS
Publicity in news media is, of course, a powerful force in bringing pub-
lic and political opinion to bear; and it often results from legislative con-
cern over administrative affairs.
REPRESENTATIVE AGENCIES
Certain agencies differ from the usual pattern because they are
representative in one sense or another of the interests affected. Spe-
cial considerations are applicable to them. Their procedure, like that
of a legislature, might be expected to draw on the knowledge and views
the members of the agency possessed or on the information and
opinions they could derive from their constituencies, with secondary
reliance on facts and arguments brought forth in proceedings in which
affected parties might participate. Such are the traditional processes
within small units of local government, where not only the enact-
ment of ordinances by elected officers but many administrative items,
even though they are of especial concern to certain inhabitants, may
be handled informally by elected or appointed officers on the basis of
knowledge which the deciding authorities already have or can readily
acquire. So, for example, the revocation without a hearing of the license
of a popcorn vendor on the streets of a community, in a case which has
been cited as illustrative of want of procedural due process, was based
on alleged persistent noisiness of the vendor despite warnings. 52 His
conduct was reported to the elected local council, which revoked the li-
cense. There may have been danger of injustice which a hearing might
have corrected in the particular case, because the community was a resort
town and the licensed operation a temporary one during the summers
when there were many transients, and because the incident grew out of a
controversy with the town police, who reported it.'53 Hence the council
may have acted without reliable information. In general, however, de-
spite a growing belief that opportunity for an adequate hearing is desir-
able in license revocation and even license issuance cases,' it is unlikely
tice of the subcommittee proceedings and directed the Court of Appeals, before which
the determinations had previously been challenged, to consider the possible bearing of the
information developed by the subcommittee on the validity of the administrative actions.
The Court of Appeals remanded the proceedings to the Commission. Sangamon Valley
Television Corp. v. United States, 358 U.S. 49 (1958) ; WIRL Television Corp. v. United
States, 358 U.S. 49 (1958); WKAT Television v. FCC, 258 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
Massachusetts Bay Telecasters v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; WORZ, Inc. v.
FCC, 358 U.S. 55 (1958); WORZ, Inc. v. FCC, 268 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Subse-
quent developments are left for discussion in a later article.
152. Vernakes v. City of South Haven, 186 Mich. 595, 152 N.W. 919 (1915).
153. See Vernakes v. City of South Haven, 181 Mich. 274, 148 N.W. 482 (1914).
154. BysE, op. cit. supra note 123, at 64-70, 99-101; DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
TREATISE (1958), §§ 7.18, 7.19.
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that injustice would often occur for procedural reasons, including the
absence of a hearing, in the handling of such matters by the elected city
fathers in small communities; for they would ordinarily either know the
facts or be able readily to ascertain them. A more probable cause of abuse
would be prejudice against an individual or a minority, which administra-
tive or court review might counteract better than original hearings.
Appointed bodies may be drawn from localities for administrative
purposes local in scope, and be permitted to act on previous knowledge or
on information informally acquired. Local zoning appeal boards, which
have power to grant or refuse variances to individual property owners
after hearing, and selective service local boards fall in this category. Tra-
ditionally the former need not base their decisions solely on the record
of the hearing, but may use their own knowledge which in many juris-
dictions need not be stated in the record. 5 Selective Service local boards
are established in each county or in areas of not more than five counties,
and are composed of three or more citizens of the United States residing
within the county or in each of the several counties composing an area.
The members do not receive compensation. 5 They are directed to select
registrants for military training and service in an impartial manner, un-
der regulations prescribed by the President. Registrants must be given
the opportunity to "appear" before the boards, before their classifications
become final; but there is no hearing in the sense of a trial. Notes, rather
than transcripts, are kept, and board members are entitled to use their
knowledge, if any, of the applicant and his circumstances." 7
An available corrective for error or abuse in Selective Service local
board action lies in administrative or judicial review proceedings.158 The
155. Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255, 268 (1958);
Taub v. Pirnie, 3 N.Y.2d 188, 144 N.E.2d 3 (1957) ; Heffernan v. Zoning Bd. of Review,
50 R.I. 26, 144 Atl. 674 (1929) ; cf. People v. Walsh, 244 N.Y. 280, 155 N.E. 575 (1927),
where, as to New York City, the board is regarded as "made up of men with special
qualifications of training and experience," rather than as representative in character.
156. 62 Stat. 618 as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 460(b) (3); 32 C.F.R. § 1603.3
(1954).
157. 62 Stat. 608 as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App § 455; 32 C.F.R. §§ 1624.1-1624.2
(1958) ; United States v. Nichols, 151 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Pitt,
144 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1944). The board must, of course, accord fair consideration to
the issues, United States v. Stepler, 258 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1958) ; Mintz v. Howlett, 207
F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1953), and there probably is a requirement that the registrant be given
an opportunity to rebut any information relied on by the board, by having it recorded in
the file to which he has access. United States v. Bender, 206 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1953) ;
U.S. ex rel. deGraw v. Toon, 151 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Note, 18 A.L.R.2d 552, 556
(1951).
158. Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 611,
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 456(j), provides an opportunity for a registrant who claims to be
a conscientious objector to appeal "to the appropriate appeal board." In § 10(b) (3),
62 Stat. 619, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 460(b) (3), the President is authorized to provide for
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actions of zoning appeal boards are also subject to review. Review pro-
ceedings in court may be inconvenient to bring, however, and may not
lead to complete judicial re-examination of the issues. Hence, as local
communities increase in size and complexity, and informed action by tri-
bunals relying partly on their own knowledge becomes more difficult, dis-
satisfaction with informal processes of initial decision is likely to grow.
The typical methods of zoning boards of appeals have been criticized on
this ground. " ' Either for this reason or because of a general principle
that a hearing should lead to decision based solely on the record, some
courts have held that the previous knowledge of board members or the
results of their viewing of the premises involved may not be relied upon
unless entered of record. 60
Agencies may be representative of affected interest on an occupa-
tional or economic rather than on a political or territorial basis. The
requirement of occupational qualifications for positions in agencies is
usually imposed, at least in theory, to secure expertness derived from oc-
cupational experience and knowledge. Often the requirement is also a
means of enabling a trade or profession to practice self-regulation
through members who become public officials, with the power of govern-
ment behind them. 6' Occasionally the requirement serves the purpose
of securing the representation of varied groups in the operation of a
regulatory scheme which affects them all, as is the case in agricultural
marketing control and workmen's and unemployment compensation ad-
appeals in other cases to the same boards, of which there is to be one in each Federal
judicial district.
159. In addition to attributing lack of knowledge to the purposes of zoning to the
members of typical zoning boards of appeal, a recent commentator states that "[t]he
concept of the board of appeals as a kind of poor man's court where common sense jus-
tice is dispensed by one's friends and neighbors no longer has much validity." Reps,
Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAw & CONTE1MP. PROB. 280,
284-296 (1955).
160. Tomko v. Vissers, 21 N.J. 226, 121 A.2d 502 (1956) ; Temmink v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 205 Md. 489, 109 A.2d 85 (1954) (zoning "reclassification") ; Hyman
v. Coe, 102 F. Supp. 254 (D.D.C. 1952) (special exception) ; Giordano v. City Comm'n
of City of Newark, 2 N.J. 585, 67 A.2d 454 (1949) ; Robinson v. Town Council of Nar-
ragansett, 60 R.I. 422, 199 Atl. 308 (1938).
161. As respects state occupational regulation, in which the members of regulatory
boards are almost uniformly drawn from the occupations involved, see U.S. MARKETING
LAWS SURVEY, STATE OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 7, 18, and item 2 of the several
charts (1942). See also FESLER, THE INDEPENDENCE OF STATE REGULATORY AGENcIES
35, 46-48, 59 (1945). Boards to determine wages under minimum wage laws have
frequently included employer and employee representatives. Id. at 26; FREUND, ADmIN-
ISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 51-52 (1928); Opp Cotton Mills v.
Administrator of Wage and Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126 (1941). In England the regulation
of occupations and of certain markets by professional organizations and their "domestic
tribunals" or by representative boards, both exercising statutory powers, has been carried
quite far. See ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 336-359 (3d ed. 1951);
Abel, The Bill of Rights in the United States, 37 CAN. BAR REV. 147, 152 (1959).
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ministration under some statutes,"6 2 and under an unusual zoning statute
involved in a leading case.163 The state and county committees which
determine acreage allotments under Federal crop control programs are
composed of farmers drawn from the areas included. They combine geo-
graphical representativeness with the knowledge and experience incident
to their occupations.'64
An important Federal statute in which a scheme of group represen-
tation is provided is the Railway Labor Act, under which one-half of the
36 members of the National Railroad Adjustment Board are selected by
the carriers and one-half by such railway unions, "national in scope," as
are agreed upon or are determined by arbitration, when necessary, to be
entitled to participate in the selection. The Board has jurisdiction to
make legally effective awards in disputes between a carrier and one or
more employees, arising out of "grievances" or under collective agree-
ments, when referred to it by either party or both parties. Its members
are paid by the interests selecting them." 5 Because of this provision as
to compensation, the Adjustment Board scheme comes close to being one
in which legal power is delegated to private groups, giving rise to con-
stitutional issues ;166 but, despite the manner of selection and compensa-
162. As to milk control boards under state price-fixing legislation of the 1930's,
some of which has proven to be permanent, see U.S. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, STATE
MILK AND DAIRY LEGISLATION 27 (1941). As to workmen's compensation see FESLER,
op. cit. supra, note 161, at 24; as to unemployment compensation, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
BUR. OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, COMsPAIISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYmENT SECURITY LAWS
118-119 (1958).
163. Bradley v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Mass. 160, 150 N.E. 892 (1926).
The function of the board was modification of the boundaries of use districts, rather
than action in individual cases. Appointments by the Mayor of Boston to the Board
were limited to the nominees of the Chamber of Commerce, Central Labor Union, Real
Estate Exchange, Master Builder's Association, and certain technical and civic organi-
zations. The Supreme Judicial Court, "with some hesitation," sustained the provision
governing appointments, on the theory that it was designed to secure persons of "emi-
nent sagacity" as Board members.
164. State boards are appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture; county boards are
elected. 52 Stat. 31 (1938) as amended, 16 U.S.C.A. § 590(b). Their operations under
specific crop programs are governed by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as
amended, 52 Stat. 31, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1281 et seq. Appointed review committees of local
farmers entertain complaints by individual farmers with regard to their acreage allot-
ments. 52 Stat. 63 (1938) as amended, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1363. The decisions of these
committees must be based entirely on the record of a hearing. 52 Stat. 63 (1938), 7
U.S.C.A. § 1365, 7 C.F.R. § 711.23 (1959 Cum. Supp.). Two members of the 3-member
Railroad Retirement Board are appointed by the President acting on recommendations
of the carriers and employees respectively. 49 Stat. 973 as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. § 228.
165. 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153.
166. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-311 (1936). Compare Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 399 (1940), and see In re Opinion of the
Justices, 337 Mass. 796, 151 N.E.2d 631 (1958) ; Revne v. Trade Comm'n, 113 Utah 155,
192 P.2d 563 (1948); Herrin v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 82 P.2d 977 (1938); Bissell
Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane Co., 237 Ind. 188, 143 N.E.2d 415 (1958); Allied Prop-
erties v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 346 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1959); Hamilton
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tion of its members, the Board is a public authority and its members are
public officials. Its manner of proceeding is radically different from
that of other agencies engaged in adjudication.'67
It has been held that, unless a representative agency is so composed
as to represent all interests fairly, its exercise of authority is unconstitu-
tional. ' The prevailing view, however, is that so long as the agency is
a public one by virtue of the manner in which its members are chosen and
vested with authority, the fact that some or all of its members possess
occupational interests in the matters arising does not render its operation
invalid.' The situations in which the representative character of such
an agency may justify a less formal procedure than would otherwise be
required cannot be stated on the basis of decisions or practice; but the
same rationale as has been applied to geographically representative agen-
cies would be pertinent. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act does
not apply at all to representative agencies, except as to their publication
of agency actions. 7' Here too judicial review is an important safeguard;
and a court may intensify its review in a particular case if there is reason
to think that an occupationally representative agency may have been
prejudiced.'
KINDS OF AGENCY ACTION
In the Federal Administrative Procedure Act two broad categories
of proceedings of administrative agencies, rule-making and adjudica-
tion, are recognized. Earlier there had been a tendency to look upon
rule-making as a legislative process essentially different from the
processes which form part of administration as normally regarded.'
County Hospital v. Andrews, 227 Ind. 217, 84 N.E.2d 469, 85 N.E.2d 365 (1949), cert.
den. 338 U.S. 831; NLRB v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 276 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1960); State v.
Crawford, 104 Kan. 141, 177 Pac. 360 (1919) ; Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 314, 72
Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1355.
167. A.G. CoIS. MONOGRAPH ON RAILWAY LABOR, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., Ist
sess., Part 4 (1941); LECHT, EXPERIENCE UNDER RAILWAY LABOR LEGISLATION 10-11,
188-192 (1955).
168. State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal. 2d 436, 448, 254
P.2d 29, 36 (1953) ; Johnson v. Michigan Milk Marketing Bd., 295 Mich. 644, 295 N.W.
346 (1940) ; Becker v. State, 37 Del. 454, 472, 185 Atl. 92, 100 (1936).
169. Board of Supervisors of Elizabeth City County v. State Milk Comm'n, 191
Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d 35 (1956) ; Lucas v. State, 229 Ind. 633, 99 N.E.2d 419 (1951) ; Miami
Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Bd., 134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759 (1938);
Ellis v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363, 365-366 (1937).
170. A.P.A. § 2(a).
171. Young v. Capital Airlines, 176 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Cf. Dahlberg v.
Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 138 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1943).
172. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 15, 211
(1928); JELLINEK, VERWALTUNGSRECHT 4 (2d ed. 1929). There may be an echo of
this view in the statement of Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194 at 217 (1947), that "the administrative process deserves fostering in our
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But, because of the prevalence and practical significance of adminis-
trative rule-making functions, their importance was recognized and led
to their study as part of administrative law.' The English Commit-
tee on Ministers' Powers and the American Attorney General's Com-
mittee on Administrative Procedure dealt in their reports with rule-
making and adjudication as separate categories, both of which were re-
garded as normal administrative functions. The current fact is that
agencies may be armed with both rule-making and adjudicative functions,
and both are governed by administrative procedure legislation.
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act defines "adjudication,"
to which the Act applies, as any "agency process for the formulation of
an order," and "order" as "the whole or any part of the final disposition
(whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form) of
any agency in any matter other than rule-making."' 74 Therefore rule-
making and adjudication include, and the Act applies to, all agency de-
terminations. Many of the provisions of the Act, however, are limited
to proceedings in which a formal hearing is accorded. The Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, on the other hand, applies only to rule-
making and to "contested cases" that involve hearings.'
Provisions, partially separate, of the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act govern the proceedings in each of these two categories of
functions. Section 4 of the Act governs rule-making; Section 5 applies to
adjudication; and Sections 7 and 8 apply to those instances of both rule-
making and adjudication which, under other statutes, require opportunity
for determination on the record of a hearing. The latter two sections
differentiate for some procedural purposes between the rule-making and
system as an expeditious and non-technical method of applying law in specialized fields."
He was arguing, however, against the use of the process without, as he saw the matter,
the existence of pre-existing law, and he urged the formulation of law through rule-
making by administrative agencies, rather than by adjudication. Freund included a
Note on Regulative or Rule-Making Powers in Chapter XI of his book.
173. Amos, THE SCIENCE OF LAW 399 (1894) ; ILBERT, METHODS OF LEGISLATION
146 (1912); CARR, DELEGATED LEGISLATION (1921); Stamp, Recent Tendencies To-
wards the Devolution of Legislative Functions to the Administration, 2 J. PUBLIC ADMIN-
ISTRATION 23 (1924) ; ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING (1924) and LAW AND ORDERS (1945,
2d ed. 1956); HART, THE ORDINANCE MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (1925);
COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES (1927);
WILLIS, THE PARLIAMENTARY POWERS OF ENGLISH GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (1933) ;
BLACHLY & OATMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION (1934); HART,
THE EXERCISE OF RULE-MAKING POWER (Special Study for the President's Committee
on Administrative Management) (1937) ; Fuchs, Procedure in Administratizve Rule-
Making, 52 HARv. L. Rxv. 259 (1938).
174. A.P.A. § 2(d).
175. 1944 HANDBOOK, NAT'L. CONFERENCE OF COMM'R. ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
329; UNIFORM LAWS ANNO., Vol. 9A (Supp. 1954) 131; 33 IOWA L. REV. 372 (1948);
Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, id., 197.
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the adjudication that come under them, so as to alleviate for the former
some of the procedural strictness required for the latter. Other sections,
including Section 10 relating to judicial review, apply to agency action
regardless of its nature. State administrative procedure legislation gen-
erally contains distinct provisions for rule-making and adjudication,
sometimes in separate statutes.'"
Various definitions of rule-making and adjudication have been
given in statutes, judicial decisions, and legal literature. Without such
definitions, practical problems of procedure could be settled case by case
as they arise, without determining whether rule-making or adjudication
is involved, simply on the basis of practical needs in each particular in-
stance. The right to cross-examine, for example, could be extended or
withheld in a given agency proceeding without deciding whether it should
be called rule-making or adjudication."' Reference might be made, how-
ever, to such factors as the number of parties involved and whether they
were identified, which enter into the usual definitions of rule-making and
adjudication. 7' It is often convenient to reason by assigning particular
proceedings to these categories as defined, before considering the pro-
cedural requirements which apply. Statutes laying down procedural re-
quirements must ordinarily specify and define the categories to which
their provisions apply.' When a category has been defined for pro-
cedural purposes, courts and agencies must decide which particular in-
stances come within it. If, for example, a statutory hearing must be ac-
corded in adjudication but need not be offered in rule-making, it is neces-
sary to determine whether a given proceeding is adjudication or rule-
making in order to decide whether the requirement is applicable.' Simi-
176. See note 13 supra.
177. Cf. Jennings, Courts and Administrative Law-The Experienwe of English
Housing Legislation, 49 HARV. L. REv. 426 (1936); Franklin v. Minister of Town &
Country Planning, [1948] A.C. 87.
178. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) ; Bowles v. Wil-
lingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519-520 (1944); Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Texola Drilling Co.,
214 F.2d 529 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.2d 538, 225
P.2d 905 (1950) ; People v. Albert, 403 Ill. 169, 86 N.E.2d 237 (1949) ; Morrissey v.
State Ballot Law Comm'n., 312 Mass. 134, 43 N.E.2d 385 (1942) ; Columbia Terminals
Co. v. Koeln, 319 Mo. 445, 3 S.W.2d 1021 (1928); Baker v. Paxton, 29 Wyo. 500, 536,
215 Pac. 257, 268-271 (1923); Hammond v. Winder, 100 Ohio St. 433, 126 N.E. 409
(1919).
179. The English Tribunals and Inquiries Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. II, c. 66, applies
to specific tribunals enumerated in a schedule, to which the Lord Chancellor and Secre-
tary of State may add from time to time.
180. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Gart v. Cole,
263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959) ; City of Newton v. Department of Public Util. 160 N.E.2d
108 (Mass. 1959) ; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Texola Drilling Co., 214 F.2d 529
(10th Cir. 1954); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 181 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1950)
(distinction between rate-making subject to A.P.A. §§ 7 and 8, rule-making subject only
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larly, if a certain type of judicial proceeding is available to review ad-
judicative orders but not to review the products of rule-making, a court
must determine which of the two is before it in a given instance if the
reviewing function is to be properly carried out. 8'
Conventionally rule-making is regarded as the function of laying
down general regulations, whereas adjudication involves formulating
judgments or orders that apply to named persons or, in in-rem proceed-
ings, to specified situations.' This distinction involves difficulties, for
it does not necessarily determine, for example, whether an order fixing
a rate on a named railroad, which will apply to shipments by a large
number of unnamed shippers, is adjudication because it applies to the
railroad or rule-making because it applies to the shippers. Some statutory
provisions omit any meaningful definition, throwing the problem on to
the courts, or provide one which does not settle this point.183  Where,
however, a railroad is to be named in an agency order resulting from a
proceeding, its interests are involved in a manner which justifies regard-
ing the proceeding as basically adjudicative for procedural purposes. The
conventional distinction, so interpreted, is embodied in much state legis-
lation 84 and was originally intended to divide the application of Section
4 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act from the application of
Section 5.8
A different asserted distinction between rule-making and adjudica-
tion is that rule-making prescribes for the future, whereas adjudication
to § 4); Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 693-694 (9th Cir. 1949) (rule-
making subject to A.P.A. §§ 7 and 8).
181. Nelson v. State Bd. of Health, 186 Mass. 330, 71 N.E. 693 (1904) ; Kineen v.
Board of Health of Lexington, 214 Mass. 587, 102 N.E. 352 (1913).
182. See Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-making, 52 HARv. L. REv. 259
(1938), for a fuller discussion of alternative definitions of rule-making and adjudication.
Cf. Boston & Maine R.R. v. United States, 358 U.S. 68 (1958). See also JELLINEX,
op. cit. supra note 172.
183. For example, CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 11371, defines "regulation" simply as a "rule."
The Indiana definition of "rule" includes any agency "requirement . . . having the ef-
fect of law"; but "adjudication" embraces "cases applicable to particular parties." IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 60-1503, 63-3002 (Burns 1951, as supplemented). In Maryland, following
the wording of the Model Act, "rule" means regulations "of general application and
future effect," whereas "contested case" means a proceeding involving the rights "of
specific parties." MD. ANN. CODE, art. 41, § 244 (1957). Many other statutes, usually
containing the term "adjudication" instead of "contested case," are similar.
184. See note 176 s=pra.
185. The Act as originally drafted defined "rule" to include only agency statements
of "general" applicability, instead of embracing also certain statements of "particular"
applicability, as set forth in the text below. It was expanded by the House Committee
to its present scope. A.P.A. LEGIS. HIST., S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 13-
14, 236, 253-254.
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announces conclusions based on present or past facts ;186 and it makes no
difference whether or not particular parties are named in the proceedings
or in the resulting action.' The future, however, must necessarily be
dealt with on the basis of present information; and the judgments of
even the courts, based on present or past facts, must prescribe future con-
duct, such as the payment of damages or the transfer of title to a piece
of property, and often embody discretionary determinations, such as
those embraced in injunctions and criminal sentences, which are not
rigidly determined by the past.'
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act incorporates the cri-
terion of futurity in its definition of rule-making, by making "rule"
mean "the whole or any part of any statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or pre-
scribe law or policy. . . ." "Adjudication" is then defined to embrace
"agency process for the formulation of an order"; and "order," in turn,
is defined to mean "the final disposition . . . of any agency in any mat-
ter other than rule-making"'5  The definition of "rule" in the Act goes
on to state certain agency actions which constitute rules. These are "the
approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or fi-
nancial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances,
services or allowances therefor, or evaluations, costs, or accounting, or
practices bearing upon any of the foregoing." This enumeration is, how-
ever, illustrative rather than exclusive.' Under the first part of the
definition a cease-and-desist order of the Federal Trade Commission or
National Labor Relations Board, directing a respondent to discontinue
an unfair method of competition or unfair labor practice, would consti-
tute a "rule," and the proceeding which led to such an order would be
rule-making; yet such was not the legislative intention, and it has not
been contended that a cease-and-desist order involves anything other than
adjudication. Under the Act, accordingly, rule-making includes the for-
mulation of general regulations and of certain agency statements of "par-
ticular applicability," the nature of which is indicated by the enumeration
contained in the definition; and adjudication embraces all other agency
186. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 211 U.S. 210 (1908) ; L. & N.R.R. v.
Garrett, 231 U.S. 298 (1913) ; Lucia v. Water & Sewer Comm'rs, 332 Mass. 298, 125
N.E.2d 776 (1955).
187. Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189 Mass. 247, 75 N.E. 619 (1905) (order directing
cessation of the discharge of sawdust from a mill into a stream held "quasi-legislative"
so as not to require notice and hearing in advance). The injunction decree of a court,
however, even though directed against numerous unnamed persons, would be regarded as
adjudicative. Cf. United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
188. Cf. Agency Discretion, supra.
189. A.P.A. § 2(c), (d).
190. Op. cit. supra note 185, at 254.
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proceedings. Since those instances of rule-making under the Act which
involve named parties are usually subject to record-type hearings under
other statutes and therefore come under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act, the
procedural protections prescribed in these sections are available. Rule-
making which does not involve named parties, even though it may affect
certain interests vitally by increasing their costs or curtailing their ad-
vantages in business competition, ordinarily comes only under Section 4
of the Act, which does not secure the right to a hearing but merely an
opportunity to submit information or views informally. 9'
Another reason for broadening the rule-making category so greatly
in the Act is that considerations of policy often are prominent in the pro-
ceedings designated as rule-making.9 2 and are thought to require some-
what different procedures from adjudication.193 Some kinds of adjudi-
cation such as licensing, however, not only relate to the future, but often
involve policy considerations too, especially where the granting of a cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity, as distinguished from an occupa-
tional license to an individual, is in issue. Accordingly, initial licensing
based on the record of a hearing, but not license renewal or revocation, is
freed from some of the procedural requirements attaching to other in-
stances of adjudication under Sections 7 and 8. Much other adjudication
under the Act also turns prominently on policy considerations, however,
notably under the Federal Trade Commission Act which requires that
important issues of economic policy be resolved in cease-and-desist orders
directed at "unfair methods of competition" by single firms. Hence the
dichotomy in the Administrative Procedure Act, although it is deliber-
ately fashioned to meet practical requirements, is not a perfect basis for
procedural distinctions.
Rule-making and adjudication which establishes new precedents have
similar effect in future proceedings; but the precedent value of admin-
istrative decisions is not the same as that of court decisions, since the
strict rule of stare decisis has not been generally regarded as binding on
administrative agencies. Agencies can and do use their own precedents
191. American Trucking Ass'ns. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953) (ICC truck
leasing regulations); George A. Rheman Co. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 668
(E.D.S.C. 1955) (ICC extension of "commercial zone" of city) ; Logansport Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. FCC, 210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (allocation of television channels to
communities).
192. Since the definition of "rule" in the Act includes statements "interpreting" law
as well as policy, it cannot be said that the formulation of new policy is a feature of all
instances of rule-making under the Act. Either for this reason or because of the non-
binding nature of interpretations, § 4 of the Act exempts interpretative rule-making from
the procedural requirements imposed by that section.
193. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT
14 (1947).
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for guidance, and subordinate personnel must necessarily feel bound by
the decisions of top personnel if the actions of a far-flung body of offi-
cials, such as the Internal Revenue Service, are to be kept tolerably con-
sistent. The same values of efficiency, predictability, and justice as have
led to the practice of the courts in using precedents have produced similar
practices on the part of especially those agencies which publish written
opinions.' However, a binding obligation to follow a rule or principle
merely because it has been made the basis of prior action would be incon-
sistent with the nature of administrative decisions. 9 ' In so far as these
decisions are factual, the evidence and not prior utterances must deter-
mine them; in so far as they are discretionary, their essence lies in the ap-
plication of judgment to each case as it arises, subject to the obligation
to avoid capricious inconsistency;"96 and in so far as decisions involve de-
terminations of law (such as gauging the meaning of statutory terms
which do not leave room for discretion) the tribunal which makes bind-
ing determinations is usually a reviewing court and not the agency.'97
Only if agency action is judicially unreviewable does a situation arise in
which the obligation to follow agency precedent for its own sake on is-
sues of law might attach; and here there would be no means to enforce
the obligation, unless the legislature should take a hand.19
194. A.G. Cobs. PREPT. 466-474; Davis, The Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to
Administrative Decisions, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 111 (1957) ; Pittman, The Doctrine of Pre-
cedents and Public Service Commissions, 11 Mo. L. REv. 31 (1946) ; Administrative Lau-
Stare Dccisis in NLRB and SEC, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rxv. 618 (1939) ; Pittman, The Doc-
trine of Precedents and the Interstate Cominerce Commission, 5 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 543(1937) ; McClintock, The Administrative Determination of Public Land Controversies, 9
MINN. L. REv. 638, 639-642 (1925).
195. FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946); Virginian R.R. v. United States, 272
U.S. 658 (1926); Courier Post Publishing Co. v. FCC, 104 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ;
Motor Freight Express v. United States, 119 F.Supp. 298 (M.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd 348
U.S. 891; Mester v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1947) ; Weiss v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 40 Cal. 2d 772, 256 P.2d 1 (1953) ; Butler Oak Tavern v. Division of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, 20 N.J. 373, 120 A.2d 24 (1956) ; Motor Transit Co. v. Rail-
road Com'n, 189 Cal. 573, 209 Pac. 586 (1922). See Hyneman, Administrative Adjudi-
cation: an Analysis, 51 POL. Sci. Q. 383, 516, at 528 (1936) (New York Public Service
Commission often cited precedents but did not rest decisions simply upon them).
196. NLRB v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 276 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1960) ; Shawmut Ass'n v.
SEC, 146 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1945).
197. In Duel v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 240 Wis. 161, 1 N.W.2d
887 (1942), for example, holding that on an issue of law the state insurance commis-
sioner could not be bound by his predecessor's decision, the court meticulously examined
the issue presented, as part of its obligation as a reviewing court.
198. On certain questions of statutory interpretation, denominated "mixed ques-
tions of fact and law," on which the Supreme Court has deferred to agency conclusions,
Congress has sometimes supplanted these conclusions with its own specific prescriptions.
See NLRB v. Steinberg, 182 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1950), outlining the history of the defi-
nition of "employee" in the Labor-Management Relations Act. As to a different legis-
lative response see United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947), and the statement with
regard to 42 U.S.C.A. § 410 (k), contained in the conference report on the 1950 Social
Security Act amendments, H.R. REP. No. 2771, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 104.
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When, as ordinarily is the case, adjudication provides statutory pro-
cedural safeguards that are different from those in rule-making, an
agency may not require a party entitled to the former to vindicate his
rights in the latter, even when specific attention to those rights is prom-
ised. Hence an applicant for a license to use a television frequency must
be given the statutory adjudicative hearing upon such an application, and
may not be compelled to submit to the Federal Communications Commis-
sion's choice among rival applicants as an incident to an allocation of tele-
vision frequencies among various communities.'99 For the same reason
a holding company, exempted under a regulation of the Securities and
Exchange Commission from a requirement of Commission approval for
its reorganization, could challenge successfully the partial revocation of
the regulation, which resulted in withdrawing the exemption from only
the one company.' Nevertheless an agency which has both rule-making
and adjudicatory powers with relation to the same subject matter may
often choose which to use. In so far as agency action can be taken
soundly without detailed attention to each individual situation to be
covered, there are several manifest advantages to rule-making. These
are (1) economy of time and effort through governing many situations
at once; (2) firm guidance to affected parties by means of regulations;
and (3) confidence on the part of agency personnel in handling situations
covered by agency regulations, whether in direct enforcement of the regu-
lations or in applying them to issues in subsequent adjudication. Despite
these advantages of rule-making, some agencies, under pressure of a con-
tinuous flow of adjudicative proceedings, become immersed in resolving
the cases presented and fail to make full use of the rule-making device.'
As an alternative, general principles are often announced in adjudicative
decisions and may be summarized in annual reports ;0' but these may not
become equally as well known as published regulations and do not carry
199. Zenith Radio Corp. v. FCC, 211 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also Camp-
bell v. Galeno Chemical Co., 281 U.S. 599 1063 (1930) (regulation terminating existing
licenses is not effective against licencees entitled to individual hearings in advance of
termination).
200. Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 164 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. den. 333 U.S. 828
(1948), 175 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1948), vacated as moot 337 U.S. 901 (1949). See Nut-
ting, The Philadelphia Cases, 10 U. PITT. L. REv. 155 (1948).
201. BOARD OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH, REPORT ON PRACTICES AND PROCED-
URES OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL, H. Doc. No. 678, 78th Cong., 2d sess., at pp. 78-85,
contains an excellent summary of advantages and disadvantages of the case-by-case
method as contrasted to a generalized approach to problems. See also Hector, Problcms
of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960).
202. COIMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERN-
MENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMeMISSIONS 40-42 (1949).
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the same force.' 3 Regulations are, however, widely employed by both
Federal and state agencies, sometimes to the exclusion of case-by-case
agency action or as a prerequisite to it, especially in such areas of regula-
tion as health, safety, prescription of product standards, and control of
financial institutions.20 4
Certain other common kinds of agency actions, which come within
the definition of adjudication in the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act, but not within the category of "contested cases" under the Model
State Act and some state administrative procedure legislation, are of im-
portance. They include direct physical action, such as the abatement of
nuisances, the seizure of persons or property for health reasons, and dis-
traint for taxes. Also included is announcement by an agency of the re-
sults of inspections or tests, such as the grading of food products.
Interlocutory orders in the course of a proceeding are of course of-
ten made, and actions having only temporary effect, such as the suspen-
sion of a license or of a utility's rate, are taken from time to time by ad-
ministrative agencies. Procedures in connection with such impermanent
measures may be prescribed by statute; but they do not fall within the
definition of "order," and therefore of "adjudication," under the Federal
Act, which includes only the "final disposition" of a matter before an
agency."' The definition of "contested case" in the Model Act also ex-
cludes them except when a hearing is required by statute. The Federal
203. See note 194 supra. For a considerable period the National Labor Relations
Board announced in opinions its changing policies as to the exercise of its jurisdiction
over cases in which the effect of labor relations on interstate commerce is minimal. The
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 gives it explicit authority to
do so in regulations adopted according to the Administrative Procedure Act. 73 Stat.
541, 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(c) (1). See the account of this development in Aaron, The Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 3959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1089-1097
(1960), and The NLRB Prerogative: A Change of Policy, 7 STAN. L. REV. 554 (1955).
204. Administration of the Federal food, drug, and cosmetic laws has since 1938 in-
volved an array of rule-making funcLicns, coupled with authority to seize products and
institute condemnation proceedings in court on account of alleged violations, but with
administrative power to make binding determinations in particular cases only under ex-
ceptional circumstances. The outlines of the administrative processes established by the
Act of that year, 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C.A. ch. 9, which has since been amended in de-
tails but not fundamentally, are set forth in articles in 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. No. 1(1939). Safety in transportation and employment, preservation of the public health, and
the sound conduct of financial institutions and transactions require study of the prob-
lems involved and detailed prescription of desirable practices or prohibition of unsound
ones, as well as investigations of failures and, at times, disciplinary proceedings. Hence
rule-making is a principal administrative function exercised in relation to them. See
generally, ANDREWS, ADMINISTRATIVE LABOR LEGISLATION (1936); A.G. CoM. MONO-
GRAPHS ON THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM AND BUREAU OF MARINE INSPECTION AND
NAVIGATION, S. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d sess., Parts 9, 10; BENJAMIN, The Board
of Standards and Appeals in Vol. V of ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE
oF NEW YORK (1942).
205. A.P.A. § 2(d).
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Act, however, contains a provision applicable to interim actions "in con-
nection with any agency function," conferring a right of appearance on
interested persons in connection with these actions "so far as the orderly
conduct of public business permits."2 6 Here too informal processes are
involved, even though they occur in the course of a formal proceeding.
The foregoing varieties and characteristics of administrative agen-
cies, their processes, and the objectives sought to be attained through
their operation are of central importance in the consideration of proposals
for improving agency performance. There is scope for reform, which as
to some matters is badly needed, on a basis consistent with the agency
framework and methods that have been developed in response to social
need.
206. Id. § 6(a).
